1. Background and project aims

The clock is ticking on the carbon budget—who will step up to remove CO₂?

In a historic event, the 2015 Paris Agreement set a global goal to limit warming to well below 2 °C and to strive for under 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels by the end of the century. To meet these goals, the cumulative amount of greenhouse gases (GHGs) emitted into the atmosphere must stay within defined limits referred to as the carbon budget. To assess progress toward these targets, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) classifies emissions scenarios into pathway categories based on their likelihood of limiting warming to specific temperature thresholds. These budgets could also be exhausted before the end of the century, pushing global temperatures above the limits. However, large-scale deployment of CDR could subsequently lower temperatures again (e.g., as in the C2 pathways, simulating temporary overshoot of the 1.5 °C limit; Table 1)

Table 1: Summary of Paris-relevant climate scenarios as defined by the IPCC, which informs the selection of the global CDR need in the CARE Calculator.The carbon budget is defined as the start year of 2024.

Characteristics

While emissions reductions are the cornerstone of climate mitigation strategy, Integrated Assessment Model (IAM) scenarios, which meet the Paris Agreement goals, estimate that we will need negative emissions if we are to remain below the warming targets.

Particularly in the second half of the century, these scenarios use carbon dioxide removal (CDR) as the primary climate mitigation strategy, estimating that a total of about 670 Gt CO₂ (450–1100 Gt CO₂) will need to be removed from the atmosphere globally by 2100. Yet, it remains unclear who will deliver these removals.

Mind the gap: Are countries doing enough to scale carbon removal—or just covering their own emissions?

In the European Union, most Member States currently aim for net-zero emissions by 2050, with some aspiring to go net-negative thereafter (see Carbon Gap’s Policy Tracker), but they often provide little indication of how or by how much. Moreover, countries’ net zero plans are frequently made in isolation, disregarding the global scope of the climate crisis and the need to keep emissions within the carbon budget.

There are several reasons for this situation, including the lack of coordinated planning for how countries should contribute to the global CDR need. The heavy focus on reaching net-zero can also explain why some jurisdictions do not plan for CDR beyond what they need to neutralise their residual emissions (i.e., those hard-to-abate emissions which will remain at net-zero). Adding to this gap, many countries still report natural uptake, for example, by forests, as carbon removals, which overestimates their actual CDR capacity.

The lack of clear and sustained commitment to scaling up CDR presents several challenges. In the short term, it fails to signal that CDR is a must, with a growing role in stabilising the climate. This blind spot, in turn, hinders the mobilisation of the private sector and investors and makes it difficult to advance policy measures, such as compliance mechanisms, which could stimulate the demand necessary to meet the CDR targets outlined by the IPCC. In the long term, the lack of action threatens our ability to achieve climate goals.

Applying a global perspective to national policy

Finland reassessed its climate targets by considering the remaining global carbon budget and making realistic assumptions about the pace of decarbonisation in other countries.

Inspired by Finland’s approach and drawing from research on coordinated carbon removal (CDR) planning under the Paris Agreement, Carbon Gap developed an interactive tool to support informed decision-making on CDR targets. The Coordinated Allocation of Removal Efforts (CARE) Calculator enables users to explore coordinated and scientifically grounded EU and national CDR targets based on a global goal, and using different methods for distributing the responsibility among countries. This method aligns with Paris-compliant climate scenarios and translates into concrete CDR removal rates (in Gt CO₂e per year) for the EU and its Member States at key milestones between 2030 and 2100.

This exercise helps evaluate the potential gap between volumes of CDR consistent with a coordinated approach to meet the Paris Agreement climate objectives, as estimated by our method, and those planned in EU or national proposals (when available). Evaluating different scenarios for distributing the global CDR need highlights the nuances and implications of sharing the responsibility. At the same time, clear patterns emerge that can already guide CDR planning. Notably, our findings highlight the importance of looking beyond merely neutralising residual emissions in national long-term strategies, emphasising the broader role CDR must play in achieving global climate goals.

We begin in section 2 by outlining possible frameworks for setting meaningful CDR targets. First, section 2.1 examines the concept of CDR targets in relation to the potential roles of CDR in climate strategy. Section 2.2 introduces common allocation criteria often considered when fairly distributing environmental resources or burdens related to climate change mitigation and discusses their relevance for fairly distributing global CDR efforts. In section 3, we introduce the interactive web tool, CARE Calculator (3.1), and present three illustrative scenarios for model set-up (3.2). Section 4 places the resulting EU (4.1) and Member State (4.2) CDR contributions in context, using them to benchmark future EU and national targets by comparing them to legal commitments, residual emissions, domestic capacity, and country readiness, while also considering alternative approaches for target setting, such as IAM projections. These sections culminate with our key insights, summarised in section 4.3. In section 5, we formulate a series of recommendations to make progress on meaningful CDR targets in light of our findings.

We provide further details on the data sources, underlying calculations, and the sensitivity tests used for investigating the importance of specific model parameters in the Annexe at the end of this document.

2. Potential frameworks for setting fair CDR targets

2.1 Defining targets based on the role of CDR

Reaching our net-zero goals

Understanding where removal methods are most applicable may help inform target setting by aligning CDR deployment with broader climate objectives. As mentioned above, CDR is considered a crucial strategy for achieving net-zero targets by neutralising residual emissions and addressing possible temporary overshoot. Residual emissions are those emissions which cannot be fully eliminated through traditional mitigation measures. Therefore, a possible approach for setting CDR targets would be to estimate residual emissions and plan for sufficient CDR capacity within the necessary timeframe.

Unfortunately, currently, only 12 of the 27 EU Member States have reported their predicted future residual emissions (see Carbon Gap’s Policy Tracker). These countries generally expect to reach net-zero in the mid-century, but there is considerable variation in how these estimates are made. From the standpoint of meeting the Paris Agreement goals, using residual emission estimates to set future CDR targets is only viable if all countries aim to achieve net-zero emissions while also considering the depleting global carbon budget. However, this approach is far from being the common practice, and current estimates indicate that the remaining global carbon budget is likely to be exhausted before 2030—well before many major emitters are expected to reach net-zero. Depending on how the remaining carbon budget is allocated, some countries may have already exceeded their fair share and are thus accumulating a carbon debt.

Towards net-negative

Beyond achieving net-zero, carbon dioxide removal (CDR) is also considered a vital strategy for addressing historical emissions, facilitating a net-negative phase where more CO₂ is removed from the atmosphere than emitted after net-zero is reached. This approach emphasises CDR’s potential role in achieving long-term climate stability by potentially restoring atmospheric CO₂ concentrations to safe levels, for example, back to the preindustrial levels. It is also important to recognise that some countries may achieve net-negative emissions prior to the point of global net-zero, thereby helping to manage overshoot while others continue progressing toward their own net-zero targets. Continued CO₂ removal could not only help to meet climate targets but also act as a buffer against unforeseen emissions from natural systems, such as permafrost thawing or ecosystem disturbances. By maintaining a net-negative state, CDR provides a safety margin in the face of climate uncertainties, offering a strategic advantage in climate resilience and environmental restoration.

In this way, after globally reaching net-zero, countries would need to set CDR targets that go beyond the remaining residual emissions and scale up the CO₂ volumes needed to return to the lower global temperatures below the Paris Agreement, for example, returning to their preindustrial level. For now, only a small number of jurisdictions have committed to becoming net-negative, and none have articulated quantified objectives.

2.2 Defining targets based on allocation criteria

Main allocation criteria

The Paris Agreement is framed around the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” (CBDR-RC). The instructions around Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) in the Paris Agreement explicitly enshrine the CBDR-RC principle by allowing countries to set their own climate action targets based on their individual circumstances, capacities, and socio-economic contexts.

This recognition of countries’ differing circumstances aligns with the idea that mitigation efforts should be equitable in the distribution of benefits and side effects, as well as in sharing the burden for their delivery. Importantly, if climate objections are perceived as fair, they are more likely to be endorsed and acted upon. There is a complex and evolving discussion of how to transition to a sustainable and climate-resilient global community while also addressing economic inequalities and intergenerational justice. In this context, it is valuable to define effort-sharing approaches which adhere to principles of fairness to ensure a largescale participation and genuine acceptance of climate objectives. This section summarises three common allocation principles which have emerged from discussions on fair climate mitigation planning which may be applicable to the distribution of CDR efforts.

3. Carbon Gap’s CARE Calculator

3.1 Description of the tool

To support an informed debate surrounding future EU and Member State CDR targets, we developed the CARE Calculator. This interactive web tool explores quantified CDR contributions (in Gt CO₂e year^-1) during the 21^st century based on a range of climate scenarios and allocation criteria.

The tool simulates the relevant political debate on two levels:

1. At the international level, where the EU acts as one entity to define a total EU contribution;
2. At the EU level, to explore Member States’ contributions.

The global CDR need

The user begins by choosing a climate future by selecting a target year and defining the global CDR need for that year. The tool provides ranges for the global CDR need based on the annual removal rates modelled by IAMs following Paris-relevant climate scenarios, i.e., those that limit warming to below 1.5 and 2°C within limited or no overshoot by the end of the century (C1, C2 and C3 pathways; Table 1). We here rely on the CDR estimation from the set of 455 scenarios compiled by the latest State of CDR report. Global CDR need, as shown in the tool, reflects the summed volumes of both conventional and novel removals. It is worth emphasising that the selected global CDR need is inherently linked to the gross emissions reductions of the individual underlying model scenarios; the level of CDR required in IAMs is a direct result of the assumptions dictating the pace and intensity of emissions reductions –we make this link visible by showing the rate of emissions reductions required for each climate pathway category. Hence, the global net GHG emissions and removals used here are based on IAM scenario results, which assume that countries will lower their positive emissions and implement CDR following a globally cost-effective strategy.

The State of CDR report and other studies promote the use of sustainability criteria to filter available climate model scenarios and ensure that recommended pathways for reaching climate neutrality safeguard against potential negative social, environmental, and economic impacts. Here, we use the full set of unfiltered model outcomes as context for selecting the global CDR need, as there remain significant uncertainties about whether the human behavioural changes required to match these sustainable climate scenarios are actually attainable. We, however, caveat that such a subset of sustainable scenarios often predicts lower CDR need, due to a reduced long-term reliance on CDR. We further recognise that assumptions about regional mitigation potentials may be embedded in IAMs, which contribute to global estimates. Our use of these global estimates to determine country-level responsibility is independent of these assumptions. Indeed, our methodology is based on fairness allocation approaches, which are lacking in the IAMs, and can therefore be viewed as an alternative, not contradictory, approach.

In the tool, possible options for the target year are 2030, 2040, 2050, 2050, 2060, 2070 or 2100. We therefore provide a snapshot approach to estimate how much CDR will need to be delivered annually by a particular year, meaning it does not account for how a failure to reduce emissions in one year might increase a country’s future CDR responsibility. Postponing deployment of CDR will naturally lead to the need for greater emissions reductions and/or removals to reach the climate goals and stay within the carbon budgets by the end of the century. Scenarios resulting in high CDR deployment should also trigger further assessments on the feasibility of such volumes to detect any that exceed a country’s practical potential.

Participating country group

With the target year and global CDR need defined, the next phase of the tool simulates the ongoing international debate about the allocation of climate mitigation efforts globally, whereby the EU sets a union-wide target. First, the user chooses which countries participate in the global CDR efforts by selecting the country group. It may be logical from a climate justice perspective to apply a threshold for participation, for example, so that developed countries lead in CDR efforts. Choices include: All, Annexe I, High Income, and Upper Middle and High Income countries. Classifications for Upper Middle- and High-Income countries are derived from the World Bank; for 2023 this is defined as countries with GNI of $4,466 and $13,846 (Atlas Method; current USD), respectively. In this way, countries with less developed economies may be exempt from responsibility to deploy CDR. Note that all 27 EU countries are included in all selection options for participating countries.

Allocating the global CDR need

At the international level, the three common allocation criteria (polluter pays, ability to pay and equality) can be used to distribute the global CDR need between the participating countries and arrive at a total EU contribution (Table 2). This approach for allocation was inspired by several similar exerciseS. It is possible to select a combination of allocation criteria to distribute the needed CDR volumes. Additionally, to modify the relative importance of the selected criteria, it is possible to assign each with a specific weight (from 0-100). More importance is given to criteria with higher weights. For details on data sources and exact calculations used, please see section A1 of the Annexe.

In the next stage, the tool simulates internal debates within the EU about how much each Member State should contribute towards the defined EU CDR target. Here, all EU Member States are assumed to contribute to the EU’s carbon removal goals to varying degrees. Again, there is the possibility to consider one or more of the three common allocation principles (polluter pays, ability to pay and/or equality) and weight their relative importance (Table 2). Also, in this initial edition of the CARE Calculator, we include an additional option to test how considering countries’ natural biophysical capacity to capture and store carbon in living biomass and geological formations impacts the estimated CDR contributions of individual Member States.

To consider biophysical capacity, the user has the option to select between two different country-level datasets. Dataset 1: Reforestation, BECCS, and DACCS reflects a country’s total domestic potential for carbon removal and storage through the methods of reforestation, bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) and Direct Air Carbon Capture and Storage (DACCS). It is calculated as the most limiting factor between estimated removal and storage volumes, recognising that to ensure CDR, both a means of removing CO₂ from the atmosphere and storing it (in living biomass or geologically) are needed. For these calculations, we use the nominal estimates for Member States, i.e., the central values which account for uncertainties surrounding removal and storage potentials.

For Dataset 2: Cost-effective land-based measures, the user can draw on the average annual climate mitigation potential (Gt CO₂e / yr) of a suite of cost-effective (available up to $100/ tonne CO₂e) land-based measures. These measures reduce GHG emissions and/or enhance carbon storage, including, for example, conservation, restoration, and/or improved land management actions as well as from applying soil carbon sequestration and biochar.

Both datasets reflect a country’s natural potential to remove and store carbon domestically, but whereas Dataset 2: Cost-effective land-based measures includes a range of removal methods that protect and store carbon in living biomass and soils, the Dataset 1: Reforestation, BECCS, and DACCS includes the potential of more novel CDR methods to permanently store carbon via underground injection into geological formations.

Interpreting the outputs

The results produced by the CARE Calculator should be understood as indicative rather than prescriptive. This tool does not provide a cost-optimal solution when distributing the global CDR need, nor does it assume a net-zero pathway for the EU in isolation. Additionally, our method does not consider constraints to domestic CDR potential or sustainability beyond those inherent to IAM model scenarios, which inform the potential range for the global CDR need. Rather than prescribing a definitive solution to CDR target setting, the tool offers an exploration into how CDR targets might align with global climate goals under equity-based principles.

Table 2. Summary of optional model parameters in the CARE Calculator. See annexes for details on data sources and calculations.

3.2 Example scenarios

To explore different approaches to CDR contributions, we define a set of three illustrative scenarios (Table 3). However, we do not advocate for any particular model setup or single solution. Instead, these scenarios serve as useful benchmarks for comparison, highlighting the implications of different methodological choices.

In the Global participation – equality (GP-E) scenario, the global CDR need is allocated across all countries according to the equality principle, using current population size as the basis. Similarly, the total EU CDR Contribution is distributed among Member States in proportion to their current population. Since all countries participate, this approach results in the minimum effort required for the EU. It can therefore be seen as an idealised or overly optimistic scenario, which ignores the differences in historical responsibility and financial means that will likely feature in such discussions over countries’ obligations for climate mitigation. Such scenarios bear the risk of shortfalls from less developed countries that have inherently lower capacities to deploy CDR but face large obligations due to their population.

The Upper income – balanced equity (UI-BE) scenario assumes only Upper Middle- and High-Income countries (including all EU countries) contribute to CDR efforts, and equally considers the equality, ability to pay and polluter pays criteria when dividing the global CDR need and total EU Contributions, respectively, amongst the globally participating countries and the EU Member States. This scenario, therefore, requires higher commitment from developed countries and historically heavy polluters.

Under the Upper income – capability (UI-C) scenario, Upper middle- and High-income countries are allocated CDR contributions considering only the country’s financial and natural biophysical capacity to contribute to CDR efforts. This scenario, therefore, reflects the forward-looking potential of countries to develop and deploy CDR.

Table 3: Model set-up of three illustrative scenarios from the CARE Calculator, detailing the countries which participate in global CDR efforts, the allocation criteria at the EU and Member State level, and the specific calculation variant used. Present refers to 2023, i.e., the latest year available in the respective data inventories at the time of writing this report.

Figure 1: Total EU CDR Contributions in Gt CO₂e year-1 for 2030, 2040 and 2050 predicted by the CDR Contribution Estimator for three illustrative scenarios described in Table 3 (blue bars). The individual clustered bars indicate global CDR need in line with median values from the C1 (10.1 Gt CO₂e year), C2 (8.8 Gt CO₂e year) and C3 (7.1 Gt CO₂e year) climate pathways. Also shown are the 2030 LULUCF target and a propose permanent and LULUCF sub targets for 2040 as modelled for the scenario S3 in the Commissions Impact Assessment (grey bars).

4. How do the estimates from the CARE Calculator compare to current efforts?

4.1 The total EU Contribution

What factors are important when discussing how much CDR the EU should contribute?

Figure 1 presents the total EU CDR contributions in 2030, 2040 and 2050 predicted by the CARE Calculator for the three illustrative scenarios. As introduced, the GP-E scenario reflects maximum collaboration from countries globally and therefore also requires minimum contributions from the EU. Hence, any other configuration of the CARE Calculator, requires considerably larger volumes of removals supplied by the EU (Figs. 1 and A1). For example, in 2050 the GP-E scenarios estimates the EU should deliver between 0.4 and 0.57 Gt CO₂e annually considering the different climate pathways (Fig. 1). This volume increases to >1 Gt CO₂e year^-1 in 2050 for the UI-BE and UI-C scenarios and in nearly all other model setups (see Fig. A1).

These estimates confirm that fairness-based approaches, considering historical responsibility and financial capability, will inevitably increase the EU’s obligations, underscoring the EU’s leadership role. As these arguments are likely to be key considerations in international climate debates, it is crucial to recognise their significance. 

Figure 2: This figure illustrates how much each decision we make about parameters (i.e., the global CDR need, the participating country group, or the specific allocation criteria) can affect the EU’s total estimated CDR contribution. Bigger circles (shown in Gt CO₂e per year) mean that choosing different options for that parameter makes a big difference. Smaller circles mean the choice doesn’t change the outcome much. In other words, this figure highlights which decisions have the most influence on how much CDR the EU would need to contribute. It does this by showing the biggest difference in impact between the available options for each factor, while assuming all other factors are held constant. For the climate scenario, we used global CDR needs that match the median values of the three different pathways in 2050 — C1 (10.1 Gt CO₂e/yr), C2 (8.8 Gt CO₂e/year), and C3 (7.1 Gt CO₂e/yr).

It is additionally valuable to consider how the specific parameters (i.e., the chosen global CDR need, participating country group, and allocation criteria) influence the resulting EU contribution. Figure 2 shows the estimated impact of each parameter, illustrating which choices have the potential to increase or decrease the resulting total EU contribution most significantly. The global CDR need related to the climate pathway also has a strong, albeit less substantial impact on the EU’s CDR goal. When selecting ability to pay, the choice of which metrics to use (i.e., GNI, GNI per capita, or GNI scaled by GNI per capita) also has a large effect on how much the EU’s share of the global CDR need will be. On the other hand, choosing between the different data options for the equality and polluter pays criteria has minimal impact. In particular, the selection of the participating country group has a large impact on the total EU CDR contribution. It is therefore important to choose this parameter with care, as it significantly shapes the distribution of responsibility across countries and can outweigh the effects of other parameter choices.

For example, restricting country group to Upper middle and High income countries, as done in the UI-BE and UI-C scenarios, contributes substantially to the much larger CDR volumes in comparison to the GP-E scenario (Fig. 1; Fig. A1). Importantly, a number of Upper middle income countries which are high GHG emitters and have a relatively large population size, such as Brazil and China, are included in these scenarios (see section A3 in the Annexe). When the participating country group is restricted to only High-income or Annexe-I countries, the estimated EU CDR contribution increases considerably (Fig A1).

The UI-C scenario—which at the EU level is based only on the EU’s ability to pay—also results in considerably higher EU CDR contributions than the UI-BE scenario, implying that taking a forward-thinking approach based on a country’s financial capability alone increases the EU obligations. In particular, the EU’s contribution is heightened if GNI per capita is used as the ability to pay criteria, with the maximum contributions from the EU occurring when only Annexe I countries participate based solely on their GNI per capita (Fig. A1).

Comparing the CARE Calculator to EU and national CDR targets

Table 4: Summary of CDR targets in law as of June 2025 (see Carbon Gap’s Policy Tracker for updates), and proposed or projected CDR targets alongside results from the CARE Calculator. At the EU level, the 2030 LULUCF target[1] and the proposed 2040 (sub)targets for the EU climate law (ECL) in the Commission’s impact assessment (modelled scenario 3; S3) are included. For Sweden and Romania, the targets are described as a percentage of historical GHG emissions or current removal capacity; estimates of the absolute volumes given here are approximate. Red text indicates when the estimated CDR contributions exceed the relevant EU or Member State targets following a global CDR need in line with median values from the C1 pathways for the respective year. Note that when a corresponding target year does not exist (i.e., for 2035, 2045), the preceding target year (i.e., 2030, 2040) is used for a conservative comparison. Values are reflected in millions of tonnes (Mt) of CO₂e/yr, where one million tonnes is equivalent to 0.001 gigatonnes (Gt).

The ambition gap at the EU level

To highlight key gaps in ambition, we compare the results from our CARE Calculator to the current EU carbon removal targets. The EU aims to enhance natural carbon sinks through the Land Use, Land-Use Change, and Forestry (LULUCF) Sector to achieve a net removal of 310 million tonnes (Mt) of CO₂ (or 0.31 Gt) annually by 2030. However, carbon storage from LULUCF over the last decades has been decreasing, putting into question the future capacity of the land sink. Besides scenarios which assume global participation in CDR efforts and mainly use population size for allocation (e.g., the GP-E scenario), the estimated required CDR contributions from the EU for 2030 consistently exceed the requirements for LULUCF (Table 4; Figs. 1 and A1). For example, the UI-BE and UI-C scenarios estimate the EU contribution should be 0.75 or 0.97, respectively, using the median global CDR need from the C1 pathways (Table 4; Fig. 1).

On the horizon for 2040, the European Commission has proposed removing up to 400 Mt (or 0.4 Gt) CO₂e year^-1 through both land-based solutions (LULUCF) and novel methods, with potentially 75 or 0.075 Gt coming from novel approaches. This volume would allow a maximum of 850 Mt CO₂e to be emitted annually, enabling the EU to reach a net -90% emissions reduction by 2040. Our estimated CDR contributions for 2040, once again, considerably exceed the proposed removal targets when equal global participation is not assumed (Table 4; Fig. 1).

Although the EU has committed to becoming climate neutral by 2050, no specific CDR targets have yet been set for this timeframe. Our results show that following the GP-E scenario, EU CDR contributions range between 0.4 and 0.57 Gt CO₂e year^-1 (Fig. 1). This volume reflects the minimum effort for the EU, and assumes an overly optimistic situation where all countries contribute to global efforts based on their population size. Including any restrictions to participating country groups or considering the ability to pay and polluter pays criteria to quickly raised these obligations to >1 Gt CO₂ per year (Table 4; Figs 1 and A1).

It is unlikely that all countries will contribute equally to global CDR efforts due to differences in economic capacity, policy priorities, resource availability, and interpretations of responsibility. The gap between EU ambition and the global CDR volumes required to meet climate goals highlights the need to maintain or expand the LULUCF carbon sink while rapidly scaling up novel CDR methods. This analysis shows that the EU’s current strategy aligns only with the minimum ambition scenario and falls short of what is needed to neutralise emissions at the global level—particularly if economically developed countries do not assume a leadership role.

Figure 3: Comparison of how Member States’ CDR contributions rank according to different allocation criteria and their data variants.

4.2 Member State contributions

Who should contribute the most?

At the Member State level, we tested the sensitivity of the estimated CDR contributions by determining changes in countries’ relative rank when using the different allocation criteria and data variants (Fig. 3). Whereas some allocation criteria and their data variants estimate dramatically different CDR volumes and how countries rank relative to each other, others produce fairly similar results. For example, basing CDR responsibility on countries’ GNI per capita greatly changes the distribution of CDR responsibility across the Member States compared to using the other data variants, with the top three countries being Luxembourg, Ireland, and Denmark. Basing a country’s biophysical capacity on Dataset 1: Reforestation, BECCS, and DACCS or Dataset 2: Cost effective land-based measures also varied the distributions of the many Member States, although the top six contributors are the same (France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Poland and Romania). On the other hand, the polluter pays, equality, or other ability to pay variants (GNI and GNI scaled by GNI per capita) have a more similar distribution of shares to one another.

Figure 4 compares the estimated Member State CDR contributions in 2050, assuming a global CDR need in line with median volumes for the three illustrative scenarios following the C1 climate pathway. Strikingly, the top seven countries are consistently the same, with limited changes in position between the three scenarios; these are Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Poland, the Netherlands, and Romania (Fig. 4). Their appearance in the GP-E scenario is intuitive, as these countries rank highest for population size in the EU. In the UI-BE scenario, besides population size, the ability to pay and polluter pays criteria also determine contributions, whereas in the UI-C scenario, the distribution of Member State contributions is weighted equally based on countries’ ability to pay and natural biophysical capacity. These results send a clear message that certain EU countries should lead the way towards scaling up CDR in Europe.

Figure 4: Estimated CDR contributions for EU Member States for 2050 (dark blue bars) using median values for the Global CDR Need from the C1 climate pathway (10.1 Gt CO₂e) when applying the three illustrative scenarios: GP-E (a), UI-BE (b) and UI-C (c). Also shown are the projected residual emissions reported in national long-term climate strategies (teal bars; see also Carbon Gap’s Policy Tracker), and the range (minimum and maximum of a suite of 6 pathways) of CDR needed to reach carbon-neutrality in Europe in 2050 (orange shaded areas).

This comparison (Table 4), shows that nearly all Member States risk committing to removal levels that are substantially too low to meaningfully contribute to global climate efforts.

The only exception to this lack of sufficient commitment is Finland who has defined their removal targets considering the global carbon budget, as mentioned above. However, it should be noted that in the case of Finland, differences in the target year (Finland’s target is set for 2035, whereas our CARE Calculator looks at targets for 2030) could bring the two values closer. Importantly, Finland’s ambitious target should clearly not be seen as a reason to lower its own efforts. Since other countries with much higher targets will likely face substantial challenges in meeting them, it is vital that countries with the capacity to deliver removals maintain or even strengthen their commitments.

Generally, CDR is the planned strategy for offsetting future residual emissions. However, most European countries have yet to report their expected residual emissions in their long-term climate strategies, and those that have often follow different definitions. Nonetheless, comparisons between outputs from our CARE Calculator and planned residual emissions for Member States already reveal important insights. Figure 4 shows reported residual emissions (light teal bars) alongside estimates of Member State CDR contributions (blue bars) for 2050 following the median C1 climate pathway for the three illustrative scenarios. Following the GP-E scenario (implying maximum collaboration and minimal EU effort), our estimated Member State contributions exceed expected residual emissions in several cases, namely, for France, Italy, Spain, Sweden and Slovenia. By contrast, for Portugal, Austria, Finland and Cyprus, the anticipated residual emissions exceeded our modelled volumes for the GP-E scenario in 2050. However, if the participating country groups are restricted, or other allocation criteria besides population size are considered at the EU or Member State level, such as in the UI-BE and UI-C scenarios, our estimated Member State contributions almost always exceed the reported future residual emissions. For example, in the cases of France, Italy and Spain, which, following our methods, consistently rank in the top 5 Member States for highest CDR contributions, their CDR contributions are more than three times larger in UI-BE and UI-C scenarios than the residual emission estimates.

This gap between the estimates from the CARE Calculator and countries’ predicted future emissions illustrates that if EU parties intend to use their anticipated residual emissions as a benchmark for CDR ambitions, these efforts will fall considerably short of meaningfully contributing to global climate goals.

Figure 5 spotlights the current emissions, potential future removals need, and estimated CDR contributions according to the CARE Calculator for Germany, which routinely appears in the top ranking position under several allocation options. Similar plots for each Member State can be found through the regional analysis page of our Policy Tracker. These country-level analyses further highlight the issues discussed above—the lack of reported residual emissions and CDR target in long term planning, and the risk of planning for climate EU neutrality without considering the global nature of the climate challenge.

Figure 5: The current (2023) emission rates were sourced from the PRIMAP-hist V2.6 historical emissions dataset. Country-predicted residual emissions* were obtained from a review of residual emissions in long-term national climate strategies (see also Cabon Gap’s Policy Tracker). Where present, whiskers reflect +/- 1 standard deviation from the mean (bar height) of multiple reported residual emission estimates. Blank values reflect a lack of quantified residual emission estimates for the Member State. Also included are CDR targets currently in law for 2050; where values are blank, no country-specific CDR target has been set. The CDR need in 2050 modelled by an IAM is also included This data reflects the remaining (or residual) emissions when carbon neutrality in Europe is reached (2050) based on a cost-optimal integrated assessment model which incorporates climate, economy, technology, policy, and energy systems. Whiskers reflect +/- 1 standard deviation from the mean (bar height) of 6 modelled scenarios.

Are countries ready to reach the scale of CDR needed?

Carbon Gap is in the process of systematically assessing the political readiness of EU Member States related to several crucial themes for supporting the deployment of CDR (Fig. 6; visit the Policy Tracker). This analysis includes assessing if they have set removal targets or are taking actions to support research, infrastructure, and governance related to CDR. Of the countries assessed thus far, Germany, France, Italy and Poland are regularly ranked as requiring the highest CDR contributions. Although these countries show early or clear signs of progress in some key areas, they are not yet fully on track to support the deployment of CDR in their countries and contribute to meaningful EU-wide targets.

Figure 6: Scorecard summarising EU countries’ current political readiness relating to a number of key policy themes supporting the deployment of CDR. The colouring scheme indicates areas in which countries are moving in the wrong direction or show no signs of progress (red), show early signs of progress (orange),  show clear signs of progress (yellow), or are well on track (green). Countries which are not listed have not yet been assessed systematically by Carbon Gap. Visit Carbon Gap’s Policy Tracker for information on the methodology for categorisation and the latest Member State developments.

Additionally, it is valuable to compare the outcomes from the CARE Calculator to the current state of operational readiness of individual Member States to deliver carbon removals, for example by looking at the number of active CDR operators per Member State and the tonnes of carbon they have sold and delivered as (data compiled by CDR.fyi, June 2025; Fig. 7). This comparison will demonstrate which countries are relatively more on track for delivering removals through novel CDR methods. Of the seven countries regularly ranked as top CDR contributors according to the estimator, Spain and Poland are notably absent, with no active novel CDR operators according to the available data. Other countries in this top-ranking group, Germany, France, and Italy, have begun to develop some capacity for novel CDR methods, with Germany in particular standing out as having the most operators (17). Yet, these results clearly indicate that many of these countries have a long way to go before being able to meaningfully add to the EU’s CDR contribution.

Figure 8: Estimated CDR contributions for EU Member States for 2050 (dark blue bars of the right plot) using median values for the global CDR need from the C1 climate pathway (10.1 Gt CO₂e) when applying the three illustrative scenarios (a-c). Also shown on the same x-axis is the annual average climate mitigation potential of cost-efficient land-based measures (orange bars). The total Removal and Storage Potential relating to reforestation, BECCS and DACCS are also shown using the left x-axis (teal bars).

How do countries’ biophysical capacities align with their predicted CDR needs?

In Figure 8, we compare Member States’ contributions to the global CDR need directly against the potential natural capacity of each country to deliver CDR domestically. This comparison shows clear discrepancies could exist between countries’ required CDR contributions towards reaching global climate goals, and their natural domestic capacity. When considering the climate mitigation potential of Dataset 2: Cost-effective land-based measures (orange bars), in many cases the necessary Member-State contributions are likely to exceed countries natural capacity, and this gap increases when considering a country’s historical or financial responsibilities (Fig. 8).

Comparing the total volumes for removal and storage potential from Dataset 11: Reforestation, BECCS, and DACCS (Fig. 8; teal bars on left of each plot) also suggests some potential bottlenecks in capacity, as was previously concluded based on this dataset. For example, assuming that the total storage and removals capacity from Germany of 12.7 Gt CO₂ is distributed over the 70 year period from 2030-2100, Germany may have a domestic removal capacity close to 0.18 Gt per year, meanwhile its estimated CDR contributions are commonly much higher (Fig. 8). On the other hand, Spain, with the highest total storage and removal capacity of 19 Gt CO₂ (equating to a yearly capacity around 0.27 Gt CO₂ per year) may potentially provide removals domestically that exceed the country’s required CDR contributions (e.g., in the GP-E and UI-BE scenarios; Fig. 8). Yet, in some cases (e.g., in the UI-C scenarios), even they risk not reaching the needed CDR contributions. Overall, these discrepancies suggest that some countries may need to trade carbon removal units across borders or invest in removals beyond their own territories to meet their obligations, following the example of Switzerland, which has anticipated the need to rely on CDR from abroad to close the gap.

4.3 What key insights does the CARE Calculator provide?

To summarise the analysis presented above, adopting a coordinated approach to CDR planning such as that of the CARE Calculator, brings clear learnings:

In any reasonable scenario—that is, any scenario which does not rely on participation by all countries based just on their population size (pure equality-based approach)—the required CDR contributions exceed what currently exist in national and EU-wide strategies.

Collaboration is key. The more countries that participate in CDR efforts at the global level, the more attainable EU and national CDR targets become. If all countries participate, the EU’s contribution is minimised, whereas if the participating countries are restricted—for example, to only Annexe-I countries—the EU’s share increases dramatically. This impact can outweigh the effects of other parameter choices.

When considering Member State contributions, some allocation criteria and data choices produce dramatic differences in estimated CDR volumes and country rankings, while others show relatively little variation (Fig. 3). Basing CDR responsibility on countries’ GNI per capita or on their biophysical capacity can greatly change the distribution of CDR responsibility across the Member States—this difference is more substantial than when comparing the polluter pays, equality, or other ability to pay variants, which have a more similar distribution of shares.

Isolated national planning for net-zero goals won’t be sufficient for reaching global climate goals. If EU parties intend to use their predicted residual emissions as a benchmark for CDR ambitions, these efforts will fall considerably short of meaningfully contributing to global climate goals (Fig. 4). A similar pattern emerges when comparing CARE Calculator results to those of least-cost pathways modelled by an IAM, independent of global climate goals (Fig. 4). In reasonable scenarios, the CARE Calculator consistently projects substantially higher CDR contributions than the IAM.

Several countries (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Poland) repeatedly appear as needing to contribute the most to Europe’s CDR efforts. For example, these countries are the top contributors in all three of the illustrative scenarios, regardless of their differing allocation criteria or how their importance is weighted (Fig. 4).

Despite being top contributors, these countries—and the EU more broadly—remain insufficiently prepared politically (Fig. 6) and operationally (Fig. 7) to support the deployment and upscaling of CDR. The EU will also need to make dramatic progress in scaling up novel CDR technologies to meet future targets.

In some cases, the necessary Member State contributions are likely to exceed countries’ natural biophysical capacity to remove and store carbon domestically. This discrepancy suggests that countries may need to trade carbon removal units across borders or invest in removals beyond their own territories to meet their obligations.

Data Availability

All data used in this tool is sourced from publicly available inventories and open-source datasets. To access the data and country-level CDR contribution estimates generated through the tool, please contact the authors using the form at the bottom of this webpage. We are happy to share the outputs upon request.

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Annexe

A1. Calculating EU and member state CDR contributions  

Global CDR need

The ranges and median values for the global CDR need were derived from the For use as total CDR volumes, we summed the provided median values for conventional and novel removals for the climate pathways (C1, C2, and C3). We also added the lower and upper quartiles for conventional and novel removals to reflect an approximation of the standard deviation of the total removal volumes in a given year from the ensemble of scenarios. This range is provided solely to contextualise the choice of the global CDR need.

Polluter pays

To reflect the polluter pays principle, we calculated the corresponding share according to cumulative GHG emissions from 1850 or 1990 to present (here using the last inventory year of 2023). The emissions data (excluding LULUCF) was sourced from the PRIMAP-hist historical emissions time series.  The year 1850 aligns with the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, when large-scale fossil fuel burning began, whereas 1990 is the reference year in the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol, marking when climate change became widely recognised as a global issue. Each countries’ share is calculated accordingly:

where Cumulative Emissions_{country x} represents the total cumulative emissions of country x from the chosen start year (1850 or 1990) to present (2023). The shares of the 27 Member States are then summed to arrive at a total share for the EU according to past cumulative emissions:

Ability to pay

For the ability to pay principle, we chose to rely on gross national income (GNI) which includes both domestic production (GDP) and net income from abroad and is therefore a comprehensive measure of national wealth and financial capacity. This country-level data was sourced from the Word Development Indicators from the World Bank. First, we calculated shares according to countries’ average total GNI for a 5-year period ending in the final data inventory year (2023).

The resulting shares of the 27 Member States were thereafter summed to arrive at the total share for the EU based on GNI.

Although GNI is an ideal measure of a country’s total wealth, it does not reflect the economic status of standard of living of individuals, and therefore using such a metric may overburden countries which have a relatively large GNI due to their large population size. We therefore also calculate shares according to average :

The shares according to GNI per capita were then summed for all 27-Member States to arrive at the EU share according to GNI per capita:

To balance the limitations of using GNI or GNI per capita to allocate CDR need (see section 2.2), we additionally calculated the EU share according to average GNI rescaled by average GNI per capita (relative to 5-year period here ending in 2023). We did this calculation following the methodology of the World Resource Institute[4]. First, we calculated the Relative GNI per capita per country, which is equivalent to the GNI per capita of each participating country, divided by the world average GNI per capita for latest inventory year (2023):

We then multiplied the Relative GNI per capita by Share of GNI_{country x} to calculate the Adjusted Share of GNI per country:

Finally, we rescaled this value by dividing the adjusted share by , ensuring that the total share of all participation countries is equal to 1:

Summing the Share of GNI scaled by GNI per capita of each Member State resulted in a total share for the EU.

We also tested using only the current (2023) GNI and GNI per capita data instead of the 5-year average, but this produced negligible difference in the EU total share and was therefore excluded.

Equality

Following the equality principle, we calculated the corresponding share for each participating country according to population size using data sourced from the Word Development Indicators from the World Bank[5]:

Where Population_country is equal to the 5-year average population ending in the latest inventory year (2023). The shares of the 27 Member States were thereafter summed to arrive at the total share for the EU.

We also tested using only the current population (2023), but this produced negligible difference in the EU total share so this option was excluded.

Hybrid weighted criteria

Within the methodology of the tool, the user has the ability to create hybrid models which are based on combinations of the three above defined equity principles

Above, Share of polluter pays_{EU total ,} Share of ability to pay_{EU total}, and Share of equality_{EU total} relate to the total EU share according to the chosen calculation variant of the given equity principle. The selected weight of the given equity principle relates to the chosen percentage divided by 100. Note that when the sum of the selected weights of all principles does not equal 100, the weighted values are rescaled to sum to100, maintaining their relative proportions.

The total share for the EU calculated using the hybrid method is then multiplied by the previously selected global CDR need in the target year to obtain the CDR Target in Gt CO₂e per year for the EU.

Note that the underlying data within the CARE Calculator may be refreshed at a later date as the source data is updated; please visit the webpage for the most current information on the inventory years covered.

Determining Member State CDR contributions

In their original sources, the biophysical capacity metrics are provided in volumes of CO₂e ([6]) or CO₂e per year ([7]). We here applied a similar allocation method as used for the other equity-based criteria to determine relative shares and ensure that the total EU CDR target is fully divided amongst the Member States. Hence, a country’s share according to biophysical capacity reflects its relative capabilities considering the full capacity of the EU:

At the Member State level, there is again the possibility to create hybrid scenarios based on the combination of equality, ability to pay, polluter pays, and biophysical capacity, using prescribed weights. The resulting individual Member State shares are then multiplied by the total EU CDR contribution to calculate per Member State’s CDR contributions in Gt CO₂e per year.

A2. Sensitivity tests

We tested the sensitivity the total EU contributions to the different model parameters (global CDR need / climate scenario, participating country group, allocation criteria), and available choices therein. Figure A1 shows the EU total contribution for 2050 for the global CDR need, considering the different participation thresholds and allocation criteria. Squares are colored on gradient scale according to estimated GT CO₂e per year, illustrating which combination of choices leads to the highest or lowest required contributions from the EU.

Figure A1: Heatmap of the EU CDR contributions in Gt CO₂e in 2050 estimated using the CARE Calculator. The figure compares the outcomes when using median global CDR need from the C1 (10.1 Gt CO₂e/yr), C2 (8.8 Gt CO₂e/year), and C3 (7.1 Gt CO₂e/yr) pathways, and when based on the different allocation criteria and their data variants.

A3. Participating country groups 

All countries: Austria; Belgium; Bulgaria; Croatia; Cyprus; Czechia; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Hungary; Ireland; Italy; Latvia; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Malta; Netherlands; Poland; Portugal; Romania; Slovakia; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; Afghanistan; Albania; Algeria; Andorra; Angola; Antigua and Barbuda; Argentina; Armenia; Aruba; Australia; Azerbaijan; Bahamas; Bahrain; Bangladesh; Barbados; Belarus; Belize; Benin; Bhutan; Bolivia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Botswana; Brazil; British Virgin Islands; Brunei Darussalam; Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cabo Verde; Cambodia; Cameroon; Canada; Central African Republic; Chad; Chile; China; Colombia; Comoros; Democratic Republic of the Congo; Republic of the Congo; Costa Rica; Côte d’Ivoire; Cuba; Djibouti; Dominica; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Egypt; El Salvador; Equatorial Guinea; Eritrea; Eswatini; Ethiopia; Fiji; Gabon; Gambia; Georgia; Ghana; Grenada; Guatemala; Guinea; Guinea-Bissau; Guyana; Haiti; Honduras; Hong Kong; Iceland; India; Indonesia; Iran; Iraq; Israel; Jamaica; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Kiribati; North Korea; South Korea; Kuwait; Kyrgyzstan; Laos; Lebanon; Lesotho; Liberia; Libya; Liechtenstein; Macao; Madagascar; Malawi; Malaysia; Maldives; Mali; Marshall Islands; Mauritania; Mauritius; Mexico; Micronesia; Moldova; Monaco; Mongolia; Montenegro; Morocco; Mozambique; Myanmar; Namibia; Nauru; Nepal; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Niger; Nigeria; North Macedonia; Norway; Oman; Pakistan; Palau; Panama; Papua New Guinea; Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Qatar; Russia; Rwanda; Samoa; San Marino; São Tomé and Príncipe; Saudi Arabia; Senegal; Serbia; Seychelles; Sierra Leone; Singapore; Solomon Islands; Somalia; South Africa; South Sudan; Sri Lanka; Saint Kitts and Nevis; Saint Lucia; Saint Vincent and the Grenadines; Sudan; Suriname; Switzerland; Syria; Tajikistan; Tanzania; Thailand; Timor-Leste; Togo; Tonga; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Türkiye; Turkmenistan; Turks and Caicos Islands; Tuvalu; Uganda; Ukraine; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; United States; Uruguay; Uzbekistan; Vanuatu; Venezuela; Vietnam; Yemen; Zambia; Zimbabwe

Annex-I countries :  Australia; Austria; Belgium; Bulgaria; Canada; Croatia; Cyprus; Czechia; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Hungary; Iceland; Ireland; Italy; Japan; Latvia; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Malta; Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; Poland; Portugal; Romania; Russia; Slovak Republic; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; Turkey; Ukraine; United Kingdom; United States

High income countries (in 2023): Austria; Belgium; Bulgaria; Croatia; Cyprus; Czechia; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Hungary; Ireland; Italy; Latvia; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Malta; Netherlands; Poland; Portugal; Romania; Slovakia; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; Antigua and Barbuda; Australia; Bahamas; Bahrain; Barbados; Brunei Darussalam; Canada; Chile; Guyana; Hong Kong; Iceland; Israel; Japan; South Korea; Kuwait; Nauru; New Zealand; Norway; Oman; Palau; Panama; Russia; Saudi Arabia; Seychelles; Singapore; Saint Kitts and Nevis; Switzerland; Trinidad and Tobago; Turks and Caicos Islands; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; United States; Uruguay

Upper middle income countries (in 2023): Austria; Belgium; Bulgaria; Croatia; Cyprus; Czechia; Denmark; Estonia; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Hungary; Ireland; Italy; Latvia; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Malta; Netherlands; Poland; Portugal; Romania; Slovakia; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; Albania; Algeria; Antigua and Barbuda; Argentina; Armenia; Australia; Azerbaijan; Bahamas; Bahrain; Barbados; Belarus; Belize; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Botswana; Brazil; Brunei Darussalam; Canada; Chile; China; Colombia; Costa Rica; Dominica; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; El Salvador; Equatorial Guinea; Fiji; Gabon; Georgia; Grenada; Guatemala; Guyana; Hong Kong; Iceland; Indonesia; Iran; Iraq; Israel; Jamaica; Japan; Kazakhstan; South Korea; Kuwait; Libya; Malaysia; Maldives; Marshall Islands; Mauritius; Mexico; Moldova; Mongolia; Montenegro; Namibia; Nauru; New Zealand; North Macedonia; Norway; Oman; Palau; Panama; Paraguay; Peru; Russia; Saudi Arabia; Serbia; Seychelles; Singapore; South Africa; Saint Kitts and Nevis; Saint Lucia; Saint Vincent and the Grenadines; Suriname; Switzerland; Thailand; Trinidad and Tobago; Türkiye; Turks and Caicos Islands; Tuvalu; Ukraine; United Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; United States; Uruguay