The Norwegian government’s current Climate Action Plan (2021–2030) lays out measures to achieve 90 to 95% reductions in emissions by 2050, compared to a 1990 baseline. This 2050 target was designed by the Norwegian government to align with the objective of EU net-neutrality by 2050, and is enshrined in Norway’s Climate Change Act. However, while aligned with the EU, Norway’s 2050 target doesn’t exactly constitute a net neutrality target. Norway, in the Climate Action Plan, aspires to become a “low-emission society” by 2050, and the target for this date is expressed as a range emissions reductions (90 to 95%) compared to a 1990 baseline, without clearly stating whether this range constitutes gross emissions reductions, or a net emissions objective. This is a departure from the EU 2050 climate neutrality target, which explicitly states that achieving the 2050 target means achieving net-zero greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.

In parallel of those legally binding, EU-aligned climate objectives, Norway’s Parliament, upon ratifying the Paris agreement in 2016, has required from the government the achievement of climate neutrality by January 1, 2030. Although this target is not legally binding, and its (potential) achievement likely rely on widespread use of international carbon credits, it establishes Norway as a frontrunner in putting forward a net-neutrality target.

The government’s current Climate Action Plan (2021–2030) lays out measures to cut emissions by 50 to 55% by 2030, compared to a 1990 baseline. As mentioned for the 2050 target, the objective for 2030 was designed to align with the target of the European Climate Law (ECL) for 2030 (“Fit for 55”), but Norway’s formulation of the target departs from that used in the ECL. Norway’s Climate Change Act enshrines a 50 to 55% emissions reduction target for 2030, but fails to establish a legally binding limit on the contribution of removals to its 50 to 55% reduction objective, unlike the EU.

Aside from its target setting effort in coordination with the EU, Norway has submitted in June 2025 its updated nationally determined contribution (NDC) for 2035 to the UNFCCC, aiming for a 70 to 75% reduction in GHG emissions compared to the 1990 baseline, to be achieved through domestic measures and in cooperation with the EU.

Norway has not specified a target for 2040, but it is likely that any intermediate target for 2040 will be aligned with the EU’s 2040 target once enshrined into Norwegian law. So far, Norway’s proposed range for its 2035 target (-70 to 75%) corresponds to the rate of reduction required to go linearly from –50 to 55% reduction in 2030 to -90% in 2040 (which gives -72.5% in 2035).

In parallel to those intermediate targets to be achieved through domestic measures, Norway, as mentioned above, has set an additional “carbon neutrality” target by 2030, to be achieved through the EU ETS, increased international cooperation on emissions reductions, emissions trading and project- based cooperation, though the exact manner in which this target will be met is still unclear.

Norway does not differentiate between emissions reductions and CO₂ removals in its national targets; it uses a single net emissions framework. The 2030 target in the Climate Act is thus expressed in net terms, combining reductions and removals under one objective. The same logic prevails for the 2035 target submitted in Norway’s NDC, and for the 90 to 95% reduction objective for 2050.

There is thus no clear and separate quantitative target for CDR, with the exception of CDR accounted under the LULUCF compartment, as Norway abides by the EU LULUCF Regulation (2018/841). However, while Norway must abide by the “no debit” rule of the Regulation (Norway must ensure that overall GHG emissions from the LULUCF sector don’t exceed removals – a rule that Norway is very unlikely to break since its LULUCF sector is a net sink), it doesn’t have an upper limit on the contribution of LULUCF removals to its 2030 objective, which could lead to mitigation deterrence if LULUCF sinks appear to overperform the predictions.

As mentioned above, under the EU LULUCF Regulation, Norway does have an implicit land-use CO₂ removal objective for 2030, constituted of Norway’s share of the LULUCF sink under the EU-Norway cooperation (representing a net removal objective of approximately 15 Mt CO₂ eq per year by 2030).

However, no specific national target exists for permanent CDR methods (such as direction air carbon capture and storage (DACCS) or bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS)), and thus Norway lacks a comprehensive “target architecture”, which clearly separates gross emissions from removals, with “nested” targets for non-permanent and permanent removals within the larger removals target.

Norway’s climate goals currently do not include a specific net-negative emissions target after 2050. The Climate Action Plan’s objective is a 90 to 95% reduction by 2050, which (as mentioned above) doesn’t exactly correspond to net-neutrality under EU law. Furthermore, unlike the European Climate Law, which states that the Union will strive to “achieve net-negative emissions [after the point of net-zero GHG emissions is reached], the Norway Climate Change Act doesn’t mention net-negative objectives.

On the international stage, Norwegian officials have acknowledged the importance of negative emissions and the need to develop removals to achieve Norway’s climate objectives, but no formal commitment to achieve net-negative emissions by a certain date exists in Norway’s Climate Change Act.

Finally, the fulfilment of the (non-legally binding) 2030 objective of “climate neutrality” by Norway’s Parliament could lead Norway to be “net-negative” after 2030 in carbon accounting terms, if Norway’s efforts on this objective are pursued beyond 2030. However, a recent report by Statistisk sentralbyra, the Norwegian statistics bureau, states that the climate neutrality objective is unlikely to be achieved by 2030 if based on domestic efforts additional to those needed to reach Norway’s legally binding target as per EU regulation. That assessment implies that Norway could achieve climate neutrality by 2030, and potential net-negativity thereafter, but only through the purchase of international carbon credits, or internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOS) under Article 6.2.

Biomass sustainability

Norway’s climate strategy highlights the crucial role of sustainable biomass in its transition to a low-emission, circular economy by 2050. Biomass use is guided by a “cascading” approach that prioritises high-value and hard-to-abate applications. For example, forestry and agricultural residues are promoted as feedstock for advanced BECCS, rather than for low-efficiency power generation (indeed, given the near-total dominance of hydraulic electricity production, biomass plays no significant role in Norway’s electricity mix).

At the same time, Norway’s Climate Action Plan insists on sustainable forest management to boost CO₂ removals while preserving biodiversity and ecosystem services. The country’s long-term vision is that forests and other natural resources be managed sustainably, supplying renewable materials, energy, and carbon sinks without environmental harm.

Norway has translated these principles, and the cascading approach of biomass use, into concrete policies. For instance, the government’s biofuel blending mandates are ambitious (24.5% of transport fuel by 2021, including a sub-target for advanced biofuels) and come with strict sustainability requirements. All biofuels counted toward the mandate must meet the EU Renewable Energy Directive sustainability criteria – for instance, demonstrating significant greenhouse gas savings and avoiding feedstocks from high-carbon land.

Mitigation deterrence

Declarations by Norway’s Minister of Energy indicates that CDR should come as a complement to efforts to cut emissions. The priority for emissions reductions over removals is also expressed in Norway’s climate policy framework, such as in the 2025 joint non-paper on potential integration of removals into the EU-ETS, where Austria, Finland, Iceland, the Netherlands, and Norway emphasised that emission reductions remain a priority even as permanent carbon dioxide removals (CDR) are scaled up. The document calls for developing CDR in a way that does not undermine efforts to cut emissions, urging a “continued focus on emission reductions” alongside robust monitoring and sustainability safeguards. The intended use of Article 6 credits to meet its domestic mitigation target can also raise mitigation deterrence risks.

Note: Mitigation deterrence is explained in a separate report by Carbon Gap.

Like-for-like principle

As mentioned above, Norway lacks a comprehensive CDR strategy, which could have clearly set out core principles for CDR scale-up. Thus, there is no enshrinement of the like-for-like principle in Norwegian law. However, Norway’s commitment to fund and develop projects aiming at scaling up permanent CDR projects (see subsequent sections), as well as the Norwegian government’s proactive stance in concluding bilateral agreements under Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement to trade “durable” CDR credits, shows a certain consideration in practice of the like-for-like principle.

Note: The like-for-like principle is a precondition to reach a state of durable net-zero, in which all fossil GHG emissions are compensated by durable removals.

Norway would rely on EU frameworks for CDR monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV), as it has not developed a national certification scheme for carbon removals.

At the EU level, the Carbon Removals and Carbon Farming Regulation (CRCF), an EU-wide certification mechanism, entered into force in November 2024. Methodologies for each CDR method will be developed by the EU Commission and will be applicable across EU Member States. Norway, as an EEA member, could opt to be subjected to the CRCF, alongside the EU Member States, through a cooperation agreement with the EU, which would allow Norwegian CDR projects to receive CRCF certification. However, this process is not automatic, as Norway is not an EU Member State.

Geological CO₂ storage is already tightly monitored under the framework of the EU Monitoring and Reporting Regulation and the CCS Directive, Norway has thus implemented a set of rules for the exploration and exploitation of subsea reservoirs on the continental shelf for the transport and storage of CO₂, covering the transport, injection and storage, measurement of injected CO₂, permanence monitoring and liability mechanisms, under the regulation of 5th December 2014 no. 1517.

Thus, the Northern Lights project (part of the larger Longship project) must report stored CO₂ to regulators as per these rules. For land-based removals, Norway’s national greenhouse gas inventory uses IPCC methodologies to account for forest and soil carbon flux – those removals count toward Norway’s EU obligations but are not certified at the project level.

While no domestic framework exists today, both for low- and high-permanence removals, the Norwegian Environment Agency has projected that comprehensive MRV for engineered CDR will be needed by the 2030s and has begun studying how to design incentives (including a “reversed CO₂ tax”) that would require verified removals.

Norway has taken steps to prevent greenwashing of climate claims, though it has not issued CDR-specific advertising rules. Notably, the Norwegian Consumer Authority (Forbrukertilsynet) issued guidelines on using terms like “climate neutral” in marketing as early as 2016. These guidelines require companies to substantiate such claims with documented emissions calculations, effective emissions reductions, and high-quality offsets. For example, any claim of “climate neutral” must be backed by a transparent accounting of the company’s carbon footprint, a plan to cut emissions, and the purchase of credible offsets for the remainder.

Moreover, the Nordic consumer agencies have jointly warned against unclear “climate compensation” claims, aligning with Norway’s approach.

Companies operating in Norway are thus strongly encouraged to ensure any climate neutrality or offset claims (including those involving removals) are truthful and well-documented, but there is no clear dedicated regulation for climate-related claims.

Norway’s approach to accounting for CDR in its official climate targets is closely tied to the EU’s rules. Under the Paris Agreement, Norway’s NDC is a joint fulfilment with the EU, which considers net emissions (including the forest sink) as the core metric. Stemming from the EU Climate Law, only LULUCF removals are counted toward Norway’s current nationally determined contribution (NDC) and interim goals. Permanent CDR, including DACCS and BECCS, are currently not credited in Norway’s national emissions inventory.

BECCS can be reported under the Effort Sharing Regulation but not accounted for towards national emissions targets set by the Regulation, as per new guidelines by the European Commission.

Furthermore, the CRCF states that all certified units should count towards the EU’s NDC, which may allow Norway to eventually count permanent CDR units towards its NDC. However, inclusion in the NDC might not take place prior to the publication of the IPCC’s methodology report in 2027, which will provide guidance as to how durable CDR should be accounted for.

An exception seems possible, if Norway uses Article 6 of the Paris Agreement to acquire foreign removals, or sell domestic removals. Indeed, Norway’s 2030 climate neutrality commitment explicitly mentions the use of international credits. In such cases, Norway would adjust its inventory or progress figures (applying corresponding adjustments under Paris rules) to count those imported removals.

Going forward, Norway appears to support developing clear inventory rules for CDR – the government emphasises need for “robust and balanced rules and systems” globally for removals accounting.

Norway is emerging as a leader in establishing the framework of the Article 6 of the Paris Agreement as the basis for cross-border cooperation on CDR. In June 2025, Norway signed a bilateral agreement with Switzerland to cooperate on carbon dioxide removal projects under Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement. By signing this agreement, Norway and Switzerland established one of the world’s first frameworks for cross-border transfer of CDR “mitigation outcomes.” Concretely, the agreement enables Swiss companies, as well as the Swiss government, to purchase certified CDR carried out and geologically stored in Norway and apply those towards Switzerland’s climate targets, with corresponding adjustments by both countries. Indeed, shortly after the pact, private entities announced the first-ever trade of CDR credits under Article 6, involving a Norwegian provider and a Swiss buyer.

Norway’s government views this pilot as a way to build experience and trust in international CDR mechanisms, stating that it will enable them to test how international cooperation on CDR can work in practice.

Overall, Norway is leveraging Article 6 to both export its CO₂ storage services and laying the ground to import export removal credits, depending on the capacity of its domestic projects. Depending on potential future actions of Norway’s government on the non-binding climate neutrality by 2030 commitment, Norway could also become a significant importer of removal credits through Article 6.2 and 6.4 mechanisms. This positioning underscores the country’s commitment to shaping international cooperation on CDR deployment, while ensuring high environmental integrity in transfers of mitigation outcomes.

Legality of CO₂ transport and storage

Norway has a comprehensive legal framework governing CO₂ transport and geological storage, benefiting from the country’s extensive experience in developing CCS projects. Although not an EU member, Norway transposed the EU CCS Directive (2009/31/EC) into national law, through the Regulations on exploitation of subsea reservoirs for storage of CO₂ and transport of CO₂ on the continental shelf (Royal Decree of 5 December 2014). This framework sets out licensing regimes for exploring and exploiting offshore CO₂ storage sites, environmental and safety requirements, and long-term liability provisions in line with EU rules. Notably, it affirms that the Norwegian state has ownership of all subsea CO₂ storage reservoirs and exclusive rights to manage them. Thus, companies must obtain licenses to operate storage, ensuring public oversight.

In addition to those regulations, the Pollution Control Act also applies to CO₂ capture, requiring under its Section 11 permits for any CO₂ capture facilities onshore.

Liability for CO₂ storage, environmental safety and remediation

The Regulations on exploitation of subsea reservoirs for storage of CO₂ and transport of CO₂ on the continental shelf include post-closure responsibilities and financial security obligations for operators, similar to EU requirements under the Environmental Liability Directive.

Furthermore, the Petroleum Safety Authority has issued in 2020 dedicated CO₂ safety regulations to cover worker and installation safety for CO₂ operations.

London Protocol

Norway ratified the 2009 amendment to the London Protocol, allowing export of CO₂ for sub-seabed storage and. The bilateral agreements of April 2024 and June 2025, respectively, with Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden, and with Switzerland, to mutually recognise CO₂ transport and storage arrangements, effectively remove legal barriers allowing CO₂ captured in those countries to be shipped to and stored in Norwegian formations.

Geological storage

Norway has undertaken extensive studies to quantify its geological CO₂ storage potential through government studies.

The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD), now Norwegian Offshore Directorate, compiled detailed CO₂ Storage Atlases for the North Sea, Norwegian Sea, and Barents Sea. The atlas for the Norwegian North Sea estimates about 70 billion tonnes (70 Gt) of CO₂ storage capacity in saline aquifers and depleted fields in that region alone. This significant storage capacity underpins Norway’s strategy to become a CO₂ storage hub. The NPD’s atlases map specific formations (like the Utsira aquifer) and evaluate their reservoir quality, sealing caprock, and feasible injection rates.

These data inform licensing and development. For instance, the Northern Lights project initially utilises the Johansen formation (with an estimated capacity around five Mt per year)

Mineral and product storage

Norway’s capacity for mineral or other forms of CO₂ storage is less quantified; research is ongoing, for instance, on the mineralisation of ultramafic rocks in Norway (see here or here), but not yet mapped at scale.

Similarly, storage in long-lived products (like timber buildings) is recognised qualitatively – Norway encourages wood construction for climate benefits – but not officially tallied as CO₂ storage capacity.

Ownership of infrastructure

Under the Regulations on exploitation of subsea reservoirs for storage of CO₂ and transport of CO₂ on the continental shelf, the government retains ultimate ownership of the subsurface reservoirs (as is the case for oil and gas reservoirs). The Norwegian state licenses out the exploitation of said reservoirs but retains the right to withdraw and reattribute the licences if an operator fails to meet minimum requirements (e.g. on environmental protection). Furthermore, under section 5 to 12 of the same Regulations, the Norwegian government reserves the right to decide third-party access to CO₂ transport and storage infrastructure, a decision which can only be opposed by the infrastructure owners in duly justified circumstances, primarily capacity constraints. This provision aims to avoid monopoly control and ensures that critical infrastructure (like pipeline networks or terminals) can serve multiple users.

In that regard, the Northern Lights terminal and storage, plans to operate on an open-access model. It allows third parties (European or domestic) willing to pay to use the infrastructure to transport and store their CO₂ and thus doesn’t restrict the usage of the infrastructure to the project investors (Equinor, Shell, and TotalEnergies).

Furthermore, the state’s direct role via Gassnova (the state enterprise for CCS) and Enova (green innovation funder) also allows it to steer and underwrite projects. Essentially, Norway’s model for CO₂ infrastructure is a PPP model whereby the state absorbs initial risks and then invites commercial use. As volumes increase, the government intends for operations to become self-financing through user fees.

State support

Longship is Norway’s flagship example – the government is covering approximately NOK 22 billion (EUR 1.9 billion) of the cost through grants, about two-thirds of the total investment for the first phase. This significant subsidy was approved by Parliament to ensure Norway’s first full-scale CCS chain is viable. It covers both capture projects (at a cement plant and a waste-to-energy plant) and the Northern Lights CO₂ transport/storage network. The state support significantly reduces financial risk for the private partners (Equinor, Shell, Total) and for potential third-party customers.

Cross-border coordination

Norway has played a pioneer role in forging cross-border partnerships so that transboundary CO₂ projects are facilitated, not hindered by regulatory uncertainty.

Norway has conjointly signed bilateral agreements in 2024 under the London Protocol Amendment, with Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Sweden on cross-border transport of CO₂.

In addition to this, Norway participates in the North Seas Energy Cooperation on CCS and has a joint project with EU support: Northern Lights is recognised as a Project of Common Interest by the EU, securing EUR 131 million in Connecting Europe Facility funding.

Norway has implemented a dedicated permitting process for CO₂ transport and storage projects, through the Regulations on exploitation of subsea reservoirs for storage of CO₂ and transport of CO₂ on the continental shelf, aiming to make development efficient while ensuring safety and transparency. This process features a two-step licensing: first an exploration license to appraise a storage site, then (if successful) a full exploitation license to develop and operate the CO₂ storage facility. The Ministry of Energy regularly announces available acreage for CO₂ storage and invites applications, similar to oil/gas licensing rounds. Since 2020, Norway has accelerated these rounds – by mid-2025, 14 CO₂ storage licenses have been awarded (13 exploration licenses plus one exploitation for Northern Lights).

To prevent delay, each new license comes with a binding work program and milestones; if the licensee fails to progress, the area must be relinquished so other actors can pursue it. This ensures timeliness and avoids “banking” of storage sites.

Norway’s government also emphasises predictability and openness in their licensing procedure. Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) and public consultations are mandatory for storage development plans, guaranteeing data sharing and community input (for example, Northern Lights’ plan underwent public hearing and was approved by the government in 2019).

Additionally, Norway’s permitting integrates clear responsibility and liability transfer rules – after 20 years post-closure (or earlier if criteria met), a storage site’s liability can transfer to the state, per the CCS Directive rules. Overall, Norway’s permitting track record is positive: the flagship Longship project moved from concept to FID within a few years (2016 to 2020), aided by supportive government handling.

Biomass availability

Norway has identified specific biomass streams suitable for BECCS. These include biogenic CO₂ from waste-to-energy plants, like Oslo’s Hafslund Celsio facility (expected to capture up to 400 kt CO₂ per year of biogenic emissions) and emissions from pulp and paper mills or other industrial bio boilers. A 2023 Norwegian Environment Agency (Miljødirektoratet) analysis estimated Norway’s technical potential for BECCS at a range between 1.2 and 2.7 MtCO₂ per year by 2030 (assuming capture at major bio-point sources).

In parallel, SINTEF, with state support, has analysed the national potential in biomass availability for CDR purposes, finding that sustainably available Norwegian biomass could yield between one and 13 Mt of CO₂ removals per year via BECCS, depending on usage scenarios. This range indicates a significant upside if feedstock supply is optimised.

Likewise, a 2023 analysis by the Norwegian Environment Agency mapped possible industrial carbon removal projects (mostly bio-CCS at waste incinerators or biomass facilities, and DAC sites), noting they vary largely in scale and maturity. It highlighted that many biogenic emission sources are relatively small, meaning a broad deployment would be needed to achieve multi-megaton removal – but also confirmed substantial overall potential.

Renewable energy supply

Norway benefits from an exceptional renewable energy supply, as it gets 99% of its electricity from hydropower and other renewable sources. Coupled with vast CO₂ storage capacity, it makes it an ideal location for scaling DACCS project. The Norwegian Environment Agency (Miljødirektoratet) estimated in 2023 a DACCS potential in Norway at a 2030 horizon, between 0.9 and 3.1 MtCO₂ per year. This was based on assumptions about how many large direct air capture (DAC) plants could practically be powered and built by 2030. In a longer term, with surplus renewable power and sites for waste heat utilization, Norway could potentially host multi-megaton DAC capacity. Indeed, Climeworks’ prefeasibility study (supported by Enova) is examining a DAC plant of several thousand tonnes initially, with Norway touted as capable of hosting megaton-scale DAC plants thanks to abundant green energy and storage.

Infrastructure availability

Norway’s coast and continental shelf geography position it to easily integrate CDR projects. It has ports and shipping companies experienced in transporting CO₂, and the Northern Lights transport & storage project has placed Norway as a clear leader in developing CO₂ management infrastructure. It also has pipelines from offshore platforms that could be repurposed for CO₂ in some cases. This means the downstream value chain (transport & storage) for CDR is in place or under active development.

Land use

Norway’s geography (extensive forests, peatlands) gives nature-based removal potential through afforestation and restoration. However, these are largely already accounted for under LULUCF. Some new initiatives, like planting forests on old mountain pasture or restoring peat bogs, could modestly increase the land sink. For example, a 2013 study identified and quantified land area in Norway that could be reforested, but actual implementation faces biodiversity and land-use tradeoffs.

Potential for marine CDR

Norway is exploring opportunities in ocean-based CDR, notably with the JIP Seaweed Carbon Solutions, led by DNV, SINTEF, Equinor and partners, are running a multi-year pilot (off Trøndelag) to test large-scale kelp cultivation specifically for CO₂ removal from the atmosphere. Seedlings were deployed in 2023, and the initiative aims to develop verified methodologies for carbon capture, storage, and environmental impact assessment.

Norway doesn’t have a bespoke RD&I CDR roadmap, but CDR is embedded in several strategic research initiatives. Indeed, Norway has significant experience in RD&I on carbon capture technology, mostly CCS. For instance, the CLIMIT programme (run by Gassnova and the Research Council of Norway) has, for over a decade, funded R&D in carbon capture and storage, including components directly relevant to CDR like bio-CCS. Norway also hosts world-class facilities such as the Technology Centre Mongstad for CO₂ capture R&D. These efforts were historically aimed at CCS for emissions mitigation, but they have increasingly included negative emissions topics (like capturing biogenic CO₂ from waste-to-energy plants).

Additionally, a 2022-2023 Norwegian Environment Agency note outlined Norway’s potential for industrial CDR and policy instrument options to supports its development, laying groundwork for a coordinated approach to RD&I for industrial CDR. Negative emissions are also explicitly mentioned in the Norwegian government’s 2022 Green industrial initiative roadmap. This (non-legally-binding) document emphasises the need for public involvement in RD&I funding for green transition technologies, including carbon management infrastructure.

Those documents fall short of a formal, government-issued roadmap specifically for CDR RD&I and deployment with timelines and funding commitments. That said, Norway displays a strong focus on climate tech innovation overall, which the knock-on effect of positioning the country as a leader in carbon capture and CDR RD&I. As such, the Longship project constitutes a pioneering example of significant public funding destined both to infrastructure deployment (for the transport and storage of CO₂) and also to RD&I for CCS and CDR technologies. Although not explicated, the Norwegian government appears to pursue an investment strategy in RD&I aiming at supporting FOAK solutions across the CDR value-chain by 2030, to allow for scale-up thereafter. The establishment of research centres dedicated to carbon capture, notably the NCCS (Norwegian CCS Research Centre), which was dissolved in 2024 and followed by the gigaCCS research centre – aiming to bring CCS from the megaton to the gigaton scale. NCCS study areas already included work on CDR and public acceptance of carbon capture, and CDR is now explicitly referred in “Capture and CDR”, the first of the four research objectives of the gigaCCS centre. This displays an increasing consideration of (industrial) CDR within the carbon capture value chain and is a testimony to Norway’s significant involvement in RD&I funding for those technologies.

The government’s funding agency Enova (under the Ministry of Climate and Environment) explicitly supports industrial carbon removal projects. For example, in 2024, under its “Preliminary Study Carbon Capture 2030” grant scheme, it awarded funding to nine large CO₂ capture projects, including a DAC+ Storage project by Climeworks which was awarded a NOK 26 million (EUR 2.2 million) subsidy, for a combined capture capacity of 1.7 Mt CO₂ per year. Enova’s aim with this grant is to assist technologies with high RD&I potential that can operate by 2030, signalling a commitment to near-term CDR innovation.

Separately, the Research Council of Norway dedicates funding to carbon management R&D. As such, it co-funds the FME research centres, like the former NCCS and gigaCCS, where universities and industry develop CDR solutions alongside CCS, as well as transport and storage solutions.

The Research Council of Norway also proposes subsidies to corporate projects through CLIMIT, its joint industry-research program in collaboration with Gassnova SF. They provides grants for pilot and demonstration projects in CCS, to which firms developing bio-CCS or DACCS are eligible.

Thus, while Norway does not yet have a dedicated CDR innovation fund or dedicated funding streams for RD&I on specific CDR methods, it has effectively earmarked money under broader programs, usually focusing on CCS, that is being used for CDR method development (especially BECCS and DACSS). The ongoing support for Longship’s innovation activities (testing new capture technology at waste incineration, developing CO₂ shipping solutions, etc.) also constitutes public funding dedicated to advancing CDR-enabling tech.

Norway is in the process of formulating incentives for engineered carbon removals, though concrete schemes have not yet been implemented. A significant development came in March 2023 when the Norwegian Environment Agency recommended a “reverse CO₂ tax” subsidy for carbon removal, essentially paying producers for each tonne of CO₂ removed and stored. The Agency’s analysis suggested mirroring Norway’s existing carbon tax: for example, paying around NOK 2000 per tonne of CO₂ removed (approximately EUR 177 per tonne) to incentivise DACCS and bio-CCS projects. The idea is that the government would reward verified removals over a 10-year period to jump-start the market.

The proposals made in the Environment Agency’s report, complemented by the scheme proposed in a 2024 Oslo Economic report (outlining a reverse auction scheme awarding per-ton contracts-for-difference), have triggered political momentum. In 2024, Norway’s Storting (Parliament) passed Resolution 91, formally requesting the government to design a support program as a series of auctions to achieve negative emissions in industry and in waste management and to allocate funds to it in the 2026 budget. However, as of September 2025, no official announcement has been made by Norway on a dedicated deployment incentive for permanent CDR.

Norway’s policy incentives for nature-based or short-term carbon removals are relatively limited, as the country’s main focus has been on emission cuts and permanent removals.

• Forestry and land-use policies: Norway does count on increased carbon uptake in forests through sustainable forest management. In the long-term low-emissions strategy submitted by Norway to the UNFCCC in 2020, the government aims to have led forests to be better adapted to climate change and thus having enhanced their CO₂ sequestration potential, though no clear incentives can be identified. Under the current Climate Action Plan (2021 to 2030), Norway’s forest management appears to focus more on maintaining the sink, through forest conservation programs and limitation on felling, than explicitly increasing it beyond the EU LULUCF Regulation’s baseline.
• Wetland restoration: Norway has a program to restore peatlands to reduce emissions (avoidance) and potentially increase carbon uptake. Grants are available for municipalities to block drainage ditches in bogs. This mainly prevents further CO₂ release but over time can also re-accumulate carbon. However, this initiative is not framed explicitly as a CDR incentive, but as a nature conservation measure with climate co-benefit, and is of limited financial scale (EUR 2.5 million in 2025).

In summary, Norway has not established subsidies or credits specifically for short-term or nature-based CDR. Instead, it relies on existing environmental programs (forest management, agri-environment schemes) that incidentally support carbon sinks.

As an EEA Member State under agreement with the EU, Norway participates in the EU-ETS. The European Commission is due to publish a report by July 2026 examining the possible inclusion of CDR into the EU ETS or another compliance regime.

Domestically, there is currently no long-term compliance policy mandating the purchase of CDR.

Norway has not yet included CDR in existing legislation not directly pertaining to CDR, nor into sectoral standards.

However, some evolutions in guidance or local legislation could pave the way for future integration of CDR, specifically in public procurement. In 2021, Norway’s government released an “Action Plan to increase the proportion of green public procurements and green innovation”, aiming to provide guidance to public entities, both local and national, to adopt green public procurement practices. Those principles encourage low-emission solutions where possible, which could indirectly favour materials like timber (storing biogenic carbon) or products made with CO₂ removal. For example, the central government’s building policy, expressed in the Climate Action Plan, is increasing consideration of climate and environmental criteria in construction projects, encouraging more timber construction, and thus providing an implicit CDR benefit.

However, for now, CDR remains somewhat specialised and not yet embedded across policy domains (energy, agriculture, industry) in a systematic way.

Norway has one of the most comprehensive carbon pricing regimes in the world, covering sectors outside the EU ETS with significant carbon taxes. Nearly all fossil fuel use in transport, buildings, and parts of industry covered by the EU ETS faces a CO₂ tax. In 2022, about 90% of Norway’s greenhouse gas emissions faced a carbon price, with the general CO₂ tax rate at NOK 766 (EUR 70) per tonne, with a plan to steadily increase the tax to NOK 2000 per tonne by 2030 (EUR 177).

This pricing covers specifically CO₂-intensive sectors like oil and gas extraction, transport fuels, waste incineration, and agriculture fuels, which pay this carbon tax on top of the EU ETS allowances required.

The carbon tax, set at a relatively high rate, incentivises carbon capture and storage through refunds on the volumes of CO₂ effectively stored. In the case of waste incineration, the tax refund only applies for fossil emissions of CO₂, as, following the standards set in the Renewable Energy Directive (Annex VI) , biomass combustion is considered carbon neutral, thus making emissions from biogenic waste “zero rated” (i.e. not considered as net emissions).

For specific sectors like agriculture and fisheries, which are not directly taxed on biological emissions (e.g., methane), Norway uses agreements to reduce emissions through improved practices, instead of direct carbon pricing.

Norway’s policy process generally incorporates stakeholder consultation and public hearings, which extends to CDR-related decisions. For instance, when developing the Longship project, the stakeholders engaged with municipalities, like Øygarden, site of the CO₂ terminal, and held public information meetings to address local concerns (such as safety and environmental impact).

Environmental Impact Assessments for CO₂ storage licenses include a public consultation phase, allowing NGOs, indigenous minority representatives, and citizens to voice opinions.

In research and innovation, CDR-specific forums like the one organised by the Norwegian University of Science and Technology in 2021 brought together academics, industry, and policymakers to discuss how CDR fits into Norway’s climate goals.

Equity considerations in Norway’s CDR rollout have not required heavy intervention yet, but the government has shown awareness of potential issues. One example is the distribution of Longship’s economic benefits: the project is heavily state-funded with the rationale that it will secure jobs and industrial development in Norway while contributing to global climate goals. This implies an intent to share benefits nationally (taxpayer funding is justified by public good creation).

Overall, the government has not yet resorted to create formal benefit-sharing mechanisms, such as dedicated community funds or revenue-sharing from storage operations. Similarly, there are no specific policies pertaining to historical responsibility or burden-sharing in CDR.

Although Norway counts some research centres which have researched the societal implications of developing climate technologies like CICERO (Center for International Climate Research), nothing was found showing specifically public support for research programmes into social and ethical dimensions of CDR.