Poland ratified the Paris Agreement in 2016 and agreed to the “common goal” of a climate neutrality target at EU level, as articulated under the European Climate Law regulation. However Poland was the only EU member state that did not agree to “implement” climate neutrality by 2050. In addition, Poland has not adopted its own target within its national law, as most EU member states already have done or are in the process of doing.

An assessment by the European Commission of the consistency of Poland’s measures with the Union’s climate neutrality objective found progress to be “largely insufficient” in the country – in particular regarding removals in the LULUCF sector.

Donald Tusk was officially elected as the new Prime Minister of Poland on 11 December 2023, with commentators suggesting his investiture could see a positive change in climate ambition compared to the previous PiS (Law and Justice) government. The Tusk government has yet to release a concrete climate policy roadmap. In January 2024, Urszula Zielińska, Secretary of State at the Polish Ministry of Climate and Environment, indicated she would push for the adoption of a 2050 climate neutrality target by the Polish government. In the context of Poland’s presidency of the Council of the EU from January to June 2025, the Secretary of State in the Ministry of Climate and Environment Krzysztof Bolesta is expected to prioritise climate action as part of a wider focus on security.

Flowing from requirements set out in the EU Effort Sharing Regulation (ESR) and LULUCF Regulation, Poland has set national targets for 2030 for the sectors covered by the two regulations. However, the country’s raft updated NECP indicates that the ESR target is not likely to be achieved. Poland intends to use the LULUCF and other flexibility mechanisms if necessary to achieve its 2030 ESR target.

Under the European Climate Law, the EU as a whole must reduce its emissions by 55% by 2030. This commitment is reflected in the EU’s Nationally Determined Contribution to the Paris Agreement.

Beyond these EU-level targets, no specific intermediate emissions targets have been established in domestic law.

Poland has set targets for emissions reductions at the sector level under the Effort Sharing Regulation and under the EU LULUCF Regulation. However, no overarching target for gross removals (combining land sinks and technical sinks) has been set.

Poland has previously set binding targets for GHG emissions reductions from biofuels and bioliquids, committing to reduce emissions by 35% by 2017 and 50% by 2018 compared with a 2008 baseline.

Poland’s draft updated NECP notes that certain projections have found that an emissions reduction across the whole economy of 35% could be achievable by 2030. This does not constitute a target (binding or indicative). No binding target for gross emissions reductions has been adopted in Poland.

Poland has set a legally binding LULUCF target for 2030 through the EU LULUCF Regulation to deliver an additional net removal capacity of 3.3 MtCO₂ by 2030. Achieving this objective would bring Poland’s total LULUCF CDR target for 2030 to 38.1 Mt/year.

To comply with the Regulation, between 2021-2025, Poland must ensure that LULUCF sector emissions do not exceed removals, and from 2026-2029, removals must follow a linear trajectory towards the 38.1 Mt/year target for 2030.

Poland’s December 2024 CCUS strategy publication, currently undergoing consultation, suggests targets for negative emissions. The proposed targets include, by 2035, 1.2 Mt/year of BECCS in the cement and lime industry, with DACCS being deployed at a pilot scale. By 2040, the proposed target is a ceiling of 3 Mt/year in the cement and lime sector and a 4 Mt/year ceiling for BECCS across energy, waste treatment and paper (totalling 7 Mt/year of BECCS across the economy), alongside the deployment of DACCS at demonstration scale, targeting 50 kt/year.

The document sets out other relevant CCUS targets, such as targets for total CO₂ capture from all sources and targets for total CO₂ storage in the country. BECCS is expected to represent the overwhelming majority of Poland’s CDR deployment, particularly due to the ease of implementation in the cement and lime sectors where bioenergy already forms part of the energy supply. DACCS deployment is expected to be limited until the energy mix is sufficiently decarbonised, with commercial deployment expected to come after 2045.

At the EU level, the latest version of the European Climate Law states that the EU shall reach climate neutrality by 2050 and shall aim for net negative emissions thereafter, establishing the legal basis to introduce a quantified net negative target in the future. No net negative target (indicative or binding) has been set for Poland.

Biomass sustainability

Bioenergy is the main form of renewable energy in Poland’s energy mix, particularly through co-firing in coal power stations. Jointly, solid biofuels, liquid biofuels, and biogas 75.1% of the primary energy production from renewable sources in 2022 according to a report by Statistics Poland, above the EU average of 53.1%. In addition, Poland is a highly forested country with forestry industry generating higher production volumes and employment than most EU member states.

The Renewable Energy Directives from 2009, 2018 and 2023 set out rules on sustainable biomass at EU level. The original (2009) directive was transposed into Polish law via the Act on renewable energy sources ('RES Act', Dz.U. 2015 poz. 478), which highlights the need for a regulation to specify principles for sustainable biomass production, as well as the need for a national biomass strategy. The Directive was also transposed through the Act on Biocomponents and Liquid Biofuels (Dz.U. 2006 nr 169 poz. 1199), with sustainability criteria set out under Article 28b-28bc, including criteria on GHG emissions and biodiversity protection.

The draft updated NECP notes that biomass, biogas and biomethane plants with a thermal input above 2 MW (for gaseous biomass) and above 20 MW (and then 7.5 MW) for solid biomass, will have mandatory sustainability criteria for biomass sourcing.

The revised Renewable Energy Directive (2023) has not yet been transposed into Polish law, but reinforces the original sustainability rules, and extends the application of sustainability criteria (to installations using solid biomass fuels in heating, electricity, and cooling installations) from a 20 MW threshold to a 7.5 MW threshold.

Mitigation deterrence

Nothing found.

Note: Mitigation deterrence is explained in a separate report by Carbon Gap.

Like-for-like principle

Nothing found.

Note: The like-for-like principle is a precondition to reach a state of durable net zero, in which all fossil GHG emissions are compensated by durable removals.

At the EU level, the Carbon Removal and Carbon Farming Framework (CRCF), an EU-wide certification mechanism, entered into force in November 2024. Methodologies for each CDR method will be developed by the EU Commission, and will be applicable across all EU member states (including Poland).

At the EU level, the Green Claims Directive, combined with the Directive on Empowering Consumers for the Green Transition, is expected provide a comprehensive framework for climate-related claims, including what is defined as a compensation claim.

Stemming from the EU Climate Law, only land-based removals from the LULUCF sector can be accounted for in Poland’s national inventory, and can only be reported in Poland’s contribution towards the EU nationally determined contribution (NDC).

BECCS can be reported under the Effort Sharing Regulation, but not accounted for towards national emissions targets set by the Regulation, as per new guidelines by the European Commission.

Furthermore, the CRCF states that all certified units should count towards the EU’s NDC. However, inclusion in the NDC might not take place prior to the publication of the IPCC’s methodology report in 2027, which will provide guidance as to how durable CDR should be accounted for.

The CRCF states that, by 31 July 2026, the Commission needs to assess whether the CRCF and Article 6 of the Paris Agreement could be aligned. This would mean that Article 6 credits would be eligible to become CRCF units. For now, the EU’s NDC and its targets set in the European Climate Law are to be achieved only through domestic measures.

In January 2025, Robert Jeske of the Institute of Environmental Protection, a body supervised by the Ministry of Climate and Environment, published a LinkedIn article outlining how Article 6 could be a “game-changer” for the EU to deliver economically efficient climate action.

(a) Legal framework covering key aspects

The Geological and Mining Law (2011) and the 2013 and 2023 amendments to the Law are the main instruments regulating CO₂ transport and storage in Poland. The December 2024 CCUS strategy publication, which is undergoing consultation, sets out a need for further legislative amendments to unlock CCUS development in Poland.

Legality of CO₂ transport and storage

The Geological and Mining Law (2011), the 2013 amendment to the law, and other legal acts transpose the EU CCS Directive into Polish law, allowing for the regulation of underground CO₂ storage activities. Yet until recently, CO₂ storage activities have faced legal barriers in Poland, with only demonstration-scale projects permitted. Many nearby countries in the Baltic Sea region such as Lithuania, Finland, Estonia and Latvia also explicitly prohibit CO₂ storage in their national law or only allow small-scale projects. The Helsinki Convention, to which Poland is a signatory, further constrains the potential for CO₂ storage in the region, through its prohibition on marine pollution.

A recent amendment to the Mining Law has officially allowed the underground storage of CO₂ onshore in Poland. This development could allow Poland to take advantage of its large theoretical CO₂ storage potential of 209 Gt. Under the revised Law, the following features are present:

Licences are no longer required for prospecting or exploration of CO₂ storage sites, instead a ‘geological works plan’ must be submitted;

Licences are no longer required for small storage projects, less than 100 kt;

Restrictions on the size of projects are lifted, allowing commercial-scale projects, in recognition of the objectives of the Net Zero Industry Act;

Licences (environmental authorisation) continue to be required for underground storage activities to go ahead.

The EU TEN-E Regulation sets out guidelines for cross-border energy infrastructure within the EU, including trans-border CO₂ infrastructure projects.

Through the Industrial Carbon Management Strategy, the EU signalled the upcoming development of a dedicated regulatory package for CO₂ transport to cover remaining gaps in the CO₂ transport legal framework, including coordination between the many actors in the CCS value chain and standards for CO₂ purity.

Liability for CO₂ storage

The original Geological and Mining Law sets out provisions on liability for damages in Section VIII. However, these are oriented towards damages from mining plant operations rather than the release of stored CO₂. It places liability on operators conducting the activities that led to damage, or on the state if such an operator or legal successor cannot be identified.

Under the 2013 amendment to the Geological and Mining Law, the storage of CO₂ underground is introduced into the scope of regulation, and specific rules on liability are introduced. To be awarded a licence, operators must submit a development plan, including monitoring and corrective action plans, as well as the post-closure plan.

Article 6 introduces the need for corrective actions to address the risk of CO₂ leakage, and for operators to prevent and stop any leakages occurring. Article 37 introduces the condition that licences can be revoked if information is received about a leak. Article 127 sets out the exact requirements for monitoring. Monitoring of CO₂ storage sites must continue for no less than 20 years after closure under Article 21. The amendment of the Law also introduces rules on site closure to Article 93, including the transfer of liability to the state after an appropriate period of time.

Environmental safety and remediation

The EU Environmental Liability Directive provides an EU-wide liability framework for environmental damages, including those induced by geological storage sites of CO₂. It was transposed into Polish law through the Act of 13 April 2007 on the prevention and repair of environmental damage (the Damage Act). The 2013 amendment to the Geological and Mining Law amends Article 3 of the Damage Act to bring the underground storage of CO₂ explicitly within its scope. Consequently, CO₂ storage is legally considered among activities posing a risk of environmental damage, meaning the relevant provisions of the Damage Act (such as on preventive and corrective measures) will apply to operators of CO₂ storage sites.

As highlighted above, the original Geological and Mining Law sets out rules on liability for damage and appropriate remedy. Under Article 147, any damage to agricultural or forest land must be remedied and the previous state restored – either directly or through an exchange of money. In the 2013 amendment to the Law, Article 28 requires operators (and eventually states, once responsibility is transferred) to cover the costs of any environmental remediation that may be necessary under the Damage Act and to demonstrate the requisite financial security to do so. Additionally, Art. 127 requires operators to remedy any environmental damage upon site closure.

London Protocol

As mentioned above, Poland’s domestic and multilateral commitments have until recently significantly constrained its CO₂ transport and storage activities. In addition, the country has yet to ratify an amendment to Article 6 of the London Protocol, which would allow the international transport of CO₂ for under-seabed CO₂ storage.

Despite this, the December 2024 CCUS strategy publication highlights that Poland will take steps to clarify the interpretation of these rules to facilitate the storage of CO₂ in Poland.

In 2022, the EU Commission released guidance on understanding the amendment to Article 6 of the London Protocol. It concluded that the EU CCS Directive and the EU ETS Directive acted as a sufficient arrangement between countries in the European Economic Area (EEA). Therefore, according to the Commission, there is no need for bilateral agreements to implement the amendment to Article 6 of the Protocol. Bilateral agreements could be concluded only on issues not covered by the two directives.

(b) Legal framework covering all types of CO₂

The EU ETS Directive only recognises fossil CO₂ under its scope, as it only puts a price on emissions of fossil CO₂.

The TEN-E Regulation does not explicitly recognise all types of CO₂, causing confusion regarding whether projects transporting and storing biogenic and atmospheric CO₂ can be labelled as Projects of Common Interest or not.

Note: In the context of carbon management, there are three main types of CO₂, depending on their sources: atmospheric, biogenic and fossil CO₂. Atmospheric CO₂ is generally sourced from direct air capture, biogenic CO₂ from bio-energy with carbon capture and fossil CO₂ by point-source carbon capture in industrial facilities burning fossil fuels. Legal frameworks must cover all types of CO₂ to ensure equal access to CO₂ transport and storage infrastructure.

(a) Physical storage capacities

Geological storage

The EU GeoCapacity project, which ran from 2006 to 2008, assessed the CO₂ storage potential of 25 EU countries, estimating Poland’s storage capacity to be 2.9 Gt, including:

• 1761 MtCO₂ in deep saline aquifers;
• 764 MtCO₂ in hydrocarbon fields:
• 415 MtCO₂ in coal fields.

Since then, subsequent projects including assessments by the Polish Ministry of Environment and by oil companies have identified additional storage potential. Other reviews have offered diverging estimates – a report by the Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland prepared for Clean Air Task Force suggested a mean capacity of 200 Gt in four saline aquifers.

In a 2021 report, the project Building momentum for the long-term CCS deployment in the CEE [Central and Eastern Europe] region, prepared by a consortium of NGOs (and funded by the EEA and Norway Grants Fund for Regional Cooperation) assessed Poland’s storage capacity to be between 10.1-15.5 GtCO₂, including 14.5 GtCO₂ from deep saline aquifers. The lower estimate excludes certain aquifers with “uncertain safety status” or “without defined structures”.

Mineral and product storage

Nothing found.

(b) Estimation of CO₂ storage needs

Several third-party reports assess the potential role of permanent CDRs in Poland. Modelling by Carbon Free Europe assesses the role of BECCS and DACCS in different net zero scenarios, finding a limited but extant role for BECCS by 2045 in all scenarios. The Centre for Climate and Energy Analyses (CAKE), a project co-funded by the EU and the National Fund for Environmental Protection and Water Management, finds a need for CDR methods to address the final 10% of emissions (relative to 1990 levels) to reach climate neutrality, with a “significant role” for BECCS. McKinsey also expects a potential of 14 MtCO₂e/year of technological removals from BECCS and potentially DAC in Poland, alongside 23 MtCO₂e/year from nature-based CDR, to address 37 MtCO₂e/year of residual emissions expected to persist in Poland’s economy in 2050.

Ownership of infrastructure

No provisions were found in Polish legislation on state ownership of CO₂ transport and storage infrastructure.

Cross-border cooperation

The Poland EU-CCS Interconnector project, now called ECO2CEE, will connect emitters in Poland to North Sea CO₂ storage sites. However, no agreements have been signed between Poland and North Sea nations to this effect.

The framework for cross-border cooperation is set under the EU TEN-E Regulation through the “Project of Common Interest” (PCI) label. Cross-border projects that have been labelled as PCIs can apply for funding under the Connecting Europe Facility for Energy. Earning the PCI label can help projects reach a final investment decision, as the label adds a seal of assurance that the project is robust.

Indication of capture and storage volumes

The December 2024 strategy document on CCUS (under consultation) suggests potential BECCS volumes of 1.2 MtCO₂ in 2035, and up to 7 MtCO₂ in 2040, calculated based on the share of bio-based fuels used in the cement and lime sector, as well as considering the development of BECCS in the energy, paper, and waste sectors.

McKinsey estimates Poland’s CDR volumes over time based on the 37 MtCO₂e/year of residual emissions expected to persist in Poland’s economy in 2050. This includes 14 MtCO₂e/year of technological removals from BECCS and potentially DAC in Poland, alongside 23 MtCO₂e/year from nature-based CDR.

The EU Net Zero Industry Act (NZIA) set a mandatory injection capacity target of at least 50MtCO₂/year by 2030 in the EU.

State support

The 2023 amendment to the Geological and Mining Law removed fees for prospecting and exploring for CO₂ storage, as well as removing the need to apply for a “mining usufruct” (effectively, a permission to exploit the resource for mining purposes), to reduce the administrative burden of deploying CCS.

According to the Building momentum for the long-term CCS deployment in the CEE region project, Poland lacks a strategic approach to CCS and few additional policies are in place to financially support or regulate the CCS sector. CCS also has only limited mention in Poland’s draft updated NECP and in the Energy policy of Poland until 2040 (EPP2040), beyond a stated action to advance “research, education and commercial projects” to develop technologies. This is likely related to the existence of the de facto ban on commercial CO₂ storage that was only recently lifted through a legal amendment to the regulatory framework. The landscape for state support may change in the coming years following this amendment.

The framework for cross-border cooperation is set under the EU TEN-E Regulation through the Project of Common Interest (PCI) label. Cross-border projects that have been labelled as PCIs can apply for funding under the Connecting Europe Facility for Energy.

The licencing process for carbon storage projects is established under the 2013 amendment to the Geological and Mining Law, while the 2023 amendment lifts the restriction on licences to demonstration scale only (which previously was a de facto ban on commercial scale projects). Combined, the two amendments concern the following aspects of the licencing regime:

• Prospecting or exploring a complex for, and performing the activity of, underground CO₂ storage are permitted upon the acquisition of a licence;
• Licences must be granted by the minister responsible for the environment and the minister responsible for energy;
• Licencing of storage activities greater than 100 kt requires the opinion of the European Commission, in which case applications and a draft decision must be sent to the Commission within one month of receipt of the application, and the licencing authority shall issue a decision after the Commission’s opinion is received;
• Licence applications should outline the nature of the geological works and technologies to be involved, the location of injection, the amount of CO₂ to be injected, the source of CO₂, the predicted geological and hydrogeological conditions of the storage complex, an assessment of the safety, among other details;
• Licence applications must also include a monitoring plan, corrective action plan, an interim post-closure action plan;
• Licences are conditional on the demonstration of financial security of the operator, particularly to ensure the operator can cover costs including monitoring costs, remedial measures for environmental damage, and settlement in the case of CO₂ Articles 28a-28h set out in detail the requirements regarding financial security;
• Details on refusal to grant a licence or suspension of licencing are set out in Article 29 and 29a.

A 2020 report by McKinsey lays out an approach to negative emissions for Poland to address the 37 MtCO₂/year of residual emissions expected across its economy in 2050. This approach covers the advancement of nature-based options through expanding forest management practices across 1 million hectares of land, afforestation across 600,000 ha of low-quality agricultural land, roll-out of agroforestry practices on 130,000 ha of croplands, and the restoration of 132,000 ha of drained wetland. The promotion of technology-based solutions is recommended in the report, including the development of BECCS, adoption of biochar on agricultural lands, and the deployment of direct air capture (DAC). McKinsey estimates that 23 MtCO₂e/year of CDR could be delivered through natural sinks, of which, 10 MtCO₂e from existing forests, complemented by 14 MtCO₂e/year of technical removals to close the gap and achieve climate neutrality.

Biomass availability

The December 2024 strategy document on CCUS (under consultation) uses the share of bio-based fuels used in the cement and lime sector to estimate BECCS potential over time (as well as expected developments in other sectors), suggesting potential BECCS volumes of 1.2 MtCO₂ in 2035 and up to 7 MtCO₂ in 2040.

A report by IRENA estimates the biomass potential of Poland to 5 tonnes of carbon per hectare per year based on net primary productivity – a basic measure of national biomass potential. This is higher than the international average of 3-4 tC/ha/year, meaning Poland may be well placed to deploy biomass-based CDR methods such as BECCS and biochar within its territory.

The draft updated NECP notes that “solid biomass energy (including sustainable) will play the largest role in achieving the overall target” (of 29.8 % share of RES in gross final energy consumption by 2030). The document notes that requirements on sustainable biomass will impact the availability of the material.

Renewable energy

Poland’s total energy supply remains dominated by fossil fuels, with 36.1% coal, 32.6% oil and 16.2% natural gas in 2023. Its energy-related emissions have declined by only 2% since 2000. However, Poland has a growing supply of renewable electricity, which represented 21% of the grid in 2022, up from 17% in 2021. Solid biofuels, liquid biofuels, and biogas jointly represented 75.1% of primary energy production from renewable sources in 2022 according to a report by Statistics Poland. However, this energy is mainly consumed in the residential sector for heating. Wind makes up 61% of the Polish renewable electricity supply. No dedicated research has been conducted to assess the renewable energy demands specifically needed for the CDR sector in Poland.

Infrastructure availability

Poland is beginning to establish infrastructure for CO₂ transport and storage. The Poland EU-CCS Interconnector project, now called ECO2CEE, involves the construction of an open-access multi-modal liquid CO₂ import-export terminal in Gdańsk. An associated transport network including pipelines, shipping, road, and rail transport will also be developed. This network will connect emitters in Poland to North Sea CO₂ storage sites. It is expected to transport 2.7 MtCO₂ pa between 2025-2030, increasing to 8.7 MtCO₂ pa in the 2030-2035 period. ECO2CEE has been awarded the Project of Common Interest (PCI) status, providing streamlined permitting and eligibility for financial assistance under the Connecting Europe Facility.

Poland does not have a dedicated strategy for RD&I funding for CDR or CCS. The National Science Policy provides the basis for Poland’s strategic approach to funding research and innovation, within which Energy and Climate is a priority. The Policy takes an underpinning approach of technological neutrality, emphasising that no specific technologies that can deliver emissions reductions should be ruled out. The Policy emphasises a need for technology development in the area of climate-neutral industries and in renewable energy technologies including bioenergy, amongst others. CDR and CCS are not explicitly mentioned in the document.

Poland launched the Forest Carbon Farm (FCF) pilot project in 2017 to explore and enhance the capacity of forest ecosystems to retain and increase carbon sequestration. The pilot phase of the FCF project is set to last from 2017-2026, followed by up to 20 years of monitoring and assessment. The project aims to improve the carbon balance inventory in forest ecosystems, increase data acquisition for emissions reporting and removals, and ultimately contribute to a more robust carbon removal model tailored to Central European forests.

Poland’s draft updated NECP sets a target to increase research spending to 2.5% of GDP by 2030, expecting that a significant share of research investment will be spent on the energy and climate transition. Funding is not specifically earmarked for these activities.

The NEON programme, an initiative of the National Center for Research and Development, is a joint venture between the Center and PKN ORLEN, a Polish oil and gas company, which aims to support R&D in the oil and gas sector, particularly to advance the objectives of climate neutrality, circular economy, and biomass-based technologies. NEON awards funding on a competitive basis through successive funding rounds. The third competition round opened in 2023, with topics in scope including CO₂ capture from low-concentration sources, sustainable aviation fuels, and CO₂ utilisation in chemicals manufacturing.

The December 2024 CCUS strategy publication highlights that Poland will begin to develop policy support for CCUS and other low-carbon products through a Carbon Contracts for Difference (CCfD) model, with legislation in place by 2028 and auctions taking place before the end of 2030. CDR is not mentioned explicitly but could be an implicit goal for the proposed CCfD programme.

The draft updated NECP notes Poland’s plans to establish a feed-in tariff (FIT) and feed-in premium (FIP) for biogas, biomass, and biomethane installations (FITs for installations up to 500 kW and FIPs for installations from 500-1,000 kW). Dedicated auctions for operational support may be established for larger installations. With the appropriate political appetite, such policies could be tweaked to provide additional subsidies for biomass facilities equipped with CCS technology – or indeed expand their scope to provide support for other CDR methods. As of yet, the government has not committed to do so.

No dedicated incentives have been established for the carbon capture component of the BECCS value chain. Furthermore, there are no incentives in place for other permanent CDR methods.

Polish CO₂ transport and storage projects have won EU-level funding. Under the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), the Polish EU-CCS Interconnector project, now called ECO2CEE, was awarded EUR 2.5 million for feasibility studies. An open-access multi-modal liquid CO₂ import-export terminal would be built if this project moves forward.

Through the Forest Carbon Farm (FCF) initiative, Poland aims to improve the carbon sequestration capacity of its forest ecosystems to improve its carbon inventory and bolster emissions reporting for Central European forests. The exact funding available for this programme is not clear.

Apart from the Forest Carbon Farm programme, no other initiatives or programmes are included in Poland’s national policy to support carbon removals. However, supporting policies announced by the new coalition government may enhance the protection of Poland’s forests, such as limits on logging in certain forests, and a proposal to ban wood exports to non-EU countries.

The EU Common Agricultural Policy sets up direct payments through ecoschemes aiming to support environmentally friendly practices. Some activities enhancing soil carbon sequestration are among the recognised practices.

The European Commission is due to publish a report by July 2026, examining the possible inclusion of CDR into the EU Emissions Trading System or another compliance regime. The Polish government has not provided a position on this matter.

The December 2024 CCUS strategy publication noted the need for multiple demand-side policies to promote CCUS to encourage investment and adoption of technologies in sectors like construction, transport, and chemicals. The document indicates that regulations promoting the use of CO₂-based products in such sectors should be introduced, alongside certification and standardisation of such products.

Nothing found.

The 2013 amendment to the Geological and Mining Law amends the Act of 3 October 2008 on providing information on the environment and environmental protection, public participation in environmental protection and on environmental impact assessment, introducing a requirement to publicly disclose information about underground CO₂ storage activities.

The Minister for Climate and Environment established a working group on CCUS in 2021 to advance the development of CCUS in Poland. In 2023, a work programme within this group was established to address issues surrounding the public acceptability of CCUS.

Poland has been active in policy dialogues regarding the just transition, namely in the context of the transition away from its coal-dependent economy and the protection of jobs and livelihoods during the transition. At COP24 in Katowice, 50 heads of state including the Polish president signed the Solidarity and Just Transition Silesia Declaration, which highlighted the need for a just transition and an integrated approach to environmental, social, and economic challenges, in line with the UN sustainable development agenda.

In February 2021, Poland adopted the Energy policy of Poland until 2040 (EPP2040), which sets out a three-pillared approach to the Polish energy transition. Pillar 1 is the just transition, which aims to provide “new development opportunities for the regions and communities most negatively affected”, and outlines dedicated funding of PLN 60 billion (EUR 14 million) to the transition of coal regions, as well as an aim to create up to 300,000 new jobs in “high-potential industries”. CDR is not mentioned as such an industry.

In May 2021, the Polish government reached an agreement with trade unions from the coal mining sector regarding a new “social contract” for the just transition. The agreement included closure of coal mines by 2049, the establishment of the Silesian Transformation Fund, and protections for the coal mining workforce, including one-off severance payments and indexed salary rises. However, critics have called this document “unenforceable” and the plan still awaits EU approval for the state aid funding foreseen under the Fund.

The EU Just Transition Mechanism makes funding available for member states to support the green transition in territories most at risk of losing jobs due to the transition. In this context, the Just Transition Fund awarded EUR 3.85 billion to five programmes across Poland, focusing on economic regeneration and environmental restoration in coal regions of the country like Silesia and Western Małopolska. While much of this funding is dedicated towards energy measures, namely energy efficiency improvements and renewable energy deployment, they demonstrate the commitment of the Polish and EU governments to a just low-carbon economic development. This could drive the adoption of CDR measures directly through enhanced funding, or perhaps more indirectly by building political support for the green transition.

The December 2024 CCUS strategy publication highlighted the importance of social acceptance for carbon capture technologies, as Poland seeks to develop its CCUS sector. A campaign to raise awareness and acceptance in conjunction with academic bodies, NGOs and investors is planned, with a particular view to engaging communities most local to storage sites. The intention to conduct awareness-raising activities within the government is also highlighted.

The National Science Policy highlights, as a priority research area for Poland, the need for research into the social dimensions of the energy transition.

Some publicly funded research projects considering the social and ethical dimensions of the climate transition include the following:

• The Centre for Climate and Energy Analyses performed research in 2022 on How to Compute the Cost for Workers Within the “Just Transition” to a Low-carbon Future?, calculating the loss of workers associated with the low-carbon transition;
• The World Bank and European Commission partnered on the technical assistance project, Support for Polish Coal Regions in Transition, identifying policy principles for job transitions and developing a job-matching tool to identify reskilling needs;
• In 2023, the European Climate Initiative, funded by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action (BMWK), published research on Distributional Effects of Carbon Pricing in Poland.